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I. INTRODUCTION
Chaos and tension are developing in the area of maternal and fetal
rights. Substantial confusion emanates from the Supreme Court's land-
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mark abortion decision in Roe v. Wade.' In resolving conflicts between
the woman and fetus, outside of abortion, Roe's relevance is obscure.
For example, an apparent conflict exists between acknowledging a
woman's right of privacy under Roe and simultaneously imposing a
duty on her under tort law to protect the fetus. How can a pregnant
woman be treated as an ordinary tortfeasor for harming the fetus she
could have aborted? Can a state regulate a woman's behavior to protect
her fetus? Must a pregnant woman undergo surgery for the benefit
of the fetus? How does Roe affect the answers to these questions?
Adding to the confusion in this area are doubts and concerns about
the continuing validity of Roe.2 Recent abortion clinic bombings, 3 as
well as heated debates between anti-abortionists and pro-choice in-
terest groups, 4 have focused national attention on the abortion con-
troversy. Members of the Supreme Court acknowledge that recent
advances in neonatal medicine, enabling many premature babies to
survive beyond previous expectations, challenge the continuing valid-
ity of Roe. 5 Is Roe about to be, or should it be overruled? Would
overruling Roe obviate the confusion surrounding conflicts in this area?
The confusion in this area can be resolved. Section II of this article
analyzes the effect of Roe on the pregnant woman-fetus relationship
and suggests that by focusing on Roe and the woman's right to get
an abortion, the Supreme Court ignored other relevant principles. For
example, the present emphasis on abortion distracts from questions
about the state's interest in protecting the fetus and the scope of the
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See infra § IV.
3. See, e.g., Abortion Clinics Report Anxieties, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1985, § 1, at 24,
col. 1 (nationwide anxiety within abortion clinics over bombings and continuing threats of vio-
lence); Bombing Case Offers a Stark Look at Abortion Conflicts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1985,
at A12, col. 1 (account of abortion clinic bombing and fanatic fervor of alleged perpetrators in
Pensacola, Florida).
4. See, e.g., Cuomo Opposes Cardinal on Abortion, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1986, at B2, col.
4 (ongoing debate on abortion between New York's Governor Mario Cuomo and New York's
Cardinal O'Connor); Troublesome Abortion Issue: Theological Roots are Spread Wide and Deep,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1984, at A8, col. 1 (discussion of ongoing debates on abortion within
Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish communities).
5. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
452 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor suggested that medical technology is moving
viability back into the second trimester, while simultaneously moving forward into the second
trimester the point at which the state can regulate to protect maternal health. Id. at 456-57.
She suggested that because of this phenomenon, Roe is on a collision course with itself. Id. at
458. But see infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (discussion of advances made in moving
the age of viability earlier in the pregnancy).
(Vol. 39
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woman's right of privacy outside of abortion. The present focus on
abortion also undermines the significance of the woman's role as
mother of the fetus in making decisions affecting the fetus' well-being.
Established principles in these areas provide some guidance in resol-
ving maternal-fetal-state conflicts. Most important, these questions
need to be answered if the gaps left by Roe are to be closed.
Section III examines conflict resolution among the woman, fetus,
and state assuming Roe were overruled. It explores three rationales
the Supreme Court might use as a basis for overruling Roe. Section
III also demonstrates that overruling Roe will not
obviate the confusion and tension in this area because Roe ineffectively
resolves conflicts among the woman, fetus, and state outside of abor-
tion. However, by understanding the limitations of Roe and identifying
the sources of confusion in this area, courts and legislators can focus
their efforts upon establishing guidelines for resolving conflicts involv-
ing the fetus that arise during the pregnancy.
Finally, section IV explores the possibility that Roe will be over-
ruled. The question is particularly timely in light of recent changes
in Court personnel. The discussion focuses on why the Court might
reconsider Roe, the role of stare decisis7 in judicial decisionmaking,
and the possible ways the Court might justify a decision to depart
from precedent. Section V concludes that overruling Roe may not be
as imminent as some suspect, and that justifiable reasons for not
overruling it abound.
II. STATE INTERVENTION IN THE WOMAN'S PREGNANCY
UNDER ROE
A. The Roe Paradigm
At issue in Roe was the validity of a state criminal law that pro-
6. See Burger Retiring, Rehnquist Named Chief, Scalia, Appeals Judge, Chosen For Court,
N.Y. Times, June 18, 1986, at Al, col. 4. See also infra, AUTHOR'S ADDENDUM (discussing
potential impact of Justice Powell's retirement and the nomination of Judge Bork as Powell's
successor).
7. "Without the slightest fanfare, the principle of stare decisis makes its appearance in
constitutional law; Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution are to be authoritative,
are to be precedents that must be taken account of when a once-interpreted constitutional clause
comes before the Court again." Jones, Dyson Distinguished Lecture: Precedent and Policy in
Constitutional Law, 4 PACE L. REV. 11, 16 (1983). See generally, Catlett, The Development
of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should be Applied, 21 WASH. L.
REV. 158 (1946); Note, The Power that Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the
Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L. REV. 345 (1986).
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hibited abortions except to save the mother's life or healthA The Roe
Court invalidated the statute and established a trimester formula for
analyzing the constitutionality of various state laws regulating abor-
tion. Under Roe, a woman has a fundamental right to obtain an abor-
tion without state interference during the first trimester, or first three
months of pregnancy. 9 The Court recognized, however, that the state's
interest in protecting maternal health is sufficiently compelling during
the second trimester to justify reasonable state regulations designed
to further that interest.1° Finally, at the point of viability, or at the
third trimester, the Court held that the state's interest in preserving
and protecting the potential life of the fetus outweighs the woman's
right of privacy.,' During the third trimester, therefore, the state
constitutionally can proscribe abortions except when necessary to pre-
serve the life and health of the mother.12
The trimester framework, intended as a functional approach to
abortion regulation analysis, has not been the forerunner of clarity
and certainty. 3 The number of abortion cases heard by the Court
since Roe evidences the continuing struggle to understand Roe. There-
fore, it is not surprising that when a non-abortion issue arises during
the pregnancy, the relevance of Roe is obscure.
Confusion generated by Roe, outside of the abortion context, can
be attributed to the Court's holding that the fetus is not a person
8. 410 U.S. at 117 n.1. Relevant parts of the statute read as follows:
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly
procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use
toward her any violence or means whatever externally or internally applied, and
thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than
two nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment
shall be doubled. By "abortion" is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall
be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a premature birth thereof be caused.
Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or attempted by medical
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.
Id. (quoting TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191, 1196 (Vernon) (former penal code repealed
1973)).
9. Id. at 163.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 163-64.
12. Id.
13. See generally Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE
L.J. 639 (1986).
[Vol. 39
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under the Constitution.14 Although the Court declared itself incapable
of deciding when life begins, 15 its decision to allow state protection of
the viable fetus' potential life essentially contradicted that declaration.
Except for limited circumstances, the viable fetus is protected from
being aborted. This protection arises, as a matter of constitutional
law, because the viable fetus is a life capable of existing outside of
the woman's womb. 16
On the other hand, states, as independent sovereigns, are not
restricted by Roe from establishing fetal protection laws. In fact, the
fetus has enjoyed legal protection under property1 7 and criminal's laws
14. 410 U.S. at 158.
15. Id. at 159.
16. See infra note 154.
17. Following English common law, an unborn child could be named as an heir from the
moment of conception. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130 (infant in ventre sa mere, in
the mother's womb, is capable of being named heir to an estate); see also Hall v. Hancock, 32
Mass. (15 Pick.) 255 (1834), reprinted in 26 Am. Decisions 598 (1834) (in general, child is
considered to be in esse from the time of its conception). While in utero, however, a designated
heir was not recognized legally as a person. Any inheritance rights it had were contingent upon
its live birth. If it died before that event, its inchoate interests either reverted to the grantor
or passed to another heir. 2 IV. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *513; see, e.g., Marsellis v.
Thalhimer, 2 Paige Ch. 35, reprinted in 21 Am. Decisions 66 (N.Y. Ch. 1830) (inchoate interests
of child born dead go to collateral heirs of deceased father of the child, not to child's mother
in child's interest). The legal status of the fetus in property law generally remains the same
today. See, e.g., In re Holthausen's Will, 175 Misc. 1022, 1024, 24 N.Y.S.2d 140, 145 (Sur. Ct.
1941) ("It has been the uniform and unvarying decision of all common law courts in respect of
estate matters for at least the past two hundred years that a child en ventre sa mere is 'born'
and 'alive' for all purposes for his benefit."); Ebbs v. Smith, 59 Ohio Misc. 133, 137, 394 N.E.2d
1034, 1037 (1979) (beneficiaries of will include child in ventre sa mere who takes full share upon
birth); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1983). But see Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of
Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 UCLA L. REV. 233, 237 (1969) (suggesting that
unborn should have vested property rights although never born). See generally C. MOYNIHAN,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1962).
18. The status of the fetus in criminal law has varied more than has its status in property
law. Earliest reports indicate that at common law the killing of a fetus was not homicide unless
the fetus was born alive and died as a result of injuries inflicted upon it while in utero. See
Note, Taking Roe to the Limits: Treating Viable Feticide as Murder, 17 IND. L. REV. 1119,
1122 (1984) (citing E. COKE, INSTITUTES III *50 (1817)). The necessity that the child be born
alive was judicially imposed because of the difficulties in proving causation. See, e.g., Sim's
Case, 75 Eng. Rep. 1075 (Q.B. n.d.) (it cannot be determined if a child born dead was living
at the time of the battery yet, "vhen it is born living and the wounds appeare in his body, and
then he dye, the batteror shal be arraigned of murder") (note: although the exact date of this
case could not be determined, it is a seventeenth century case). For a discussion of the born
alive rule, see Note, supra.
Early common law also distinguished the "quickened" from the "pre-quickened" fetus. A
fetus is quickened when the mother can feel it move inside the womb, which usually occurs at
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 59 1987
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for centuries. Prior to Roe, jurisdictions also began to allow suits
against tortfeasors who caused fetal injury. 19 Following the pre-Roe
16-20 weeks gestation. See J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, WILLIAMS OBSTET-
RICS 218 (17th ed. 1985). Destruction of a quickened fetus, although not homicide, probably
was a crime. Abortion of a woman "quick with childe" is "a great misprision, and no murder."
Roe, 410 U.S. at 134-35 (quoting E. COKE, INSTITUTES III *50). However, whether early
common law also criminalized the destruction of a pre-quickened fetus is less certain. See Roe,
410 U.S. at 132; see also, Quay, Justifiable Abortion - Medical and Legal Foundations, 49
GEO. L.J. 395, 432 (1961) (destruction of pre-quickened fetus was not criminalized because until
the fetus was '"ifused with a soul," or "animated," it was still part of the mother). See generally
Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of Human
Life, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97 (1985).
In American jurisprudence, the killing of a fetus generally was not criminalized until anti-abor-
tion legislation became popular in the early to mid-1800s. Connecticut passed the first anti-abor-
tion statute in 1821. Quay, supra, at 435 (citing CONN. STAT. tit. 22 § 14, 16 (1821)). By the
Civil War, almost all jurisdictions had outlawed abortion. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, 175-76 n.1
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Following the common law, originally it was a greater offense to
cause the destruction of a quickened than a pre-quickened fetus. However, in the mid-1800s
the quickening distinction disappeared from all of the statutes. Id. at 139; Quay, supra, at
435-38. For example, the first anti-abortion statute in this country punished with life imprison-
ment, the abortion or the attempted abortion by poison of a quickened fetus. Id. app. I at 453
(quoting CONN. STAT. tit. 22 §§ 14, 16 (1821)). By 1830, the statute had been extended to
include the abortion of a quickened fetus by means other than drugs, but the penalty was
reduced to seven to ten years in prison. Id. app. I at 453-54 (quoting CONN. LAwS ch. 1 § 16
(1830)). In 1860, the statute was further amended to include the abortion of a pre-quickened
fetus. The penalty was reduced to one to five years in prison and the statute exempted abortions
to save the life of the woman. Id. app. I at 454 (quoting CONN. PUB. ACTS ch. LXXI §§ 1, 2
(1860)). See generally Quay, supra, at 447 (compilation of the abortion statutes of all the states
from the 1800s).
Since Roe, no statutory consensus on feticide has yet emerged. Some statutes require that
the fetus be quick when the criminal act takes place in order to constitute homicide. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 782.09 (1985) (willful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother
is manslaughter); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 1986) (the willful killing of an
unborn quick child is manslaughter). In contrast, New York requires that the fetus be viable
(24 weeks gestation) at the time of the criminal act to constitute homicide. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.00 (McKinney 1975). Other states do not require either quickening or viability. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1986) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a
fetus, with malice aforethought."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-17-6 (1986) (intentional
killing of a human fetus by an unauthorized injury to the mother is a felony). Finally, feticide
is not criminalized at all in some states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (1986); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.140 (1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-101 (1986) (homicide statutes defining person as
a human being who had been born and was alive at the time of the criminal act); Ky. REv.
STAT. § 507.010 (Baldwin 1984) (fetus not a person). Of course, Roe protects the physician and
the woman from criminal liability for aborting the pre-viable fetus, or the viable fetus if an
abortion is necessary to save the life or health of the mother. See 410 U.S. at 113.
19. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS 368 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMIENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 69 (1982).
[Vol. 39
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development, such suits typically fall into three categories: the
mother's tort suit, which compensates her for her injuries; 2° wrongful
death actions, which compensate parents for the loss of their stillborn
child;21 and the prenatal tort action, which compensates the after born
20. When a pregnant woman sues for tortious injury, her damages are measured by the
harm she suffers, which may include harm done to the fetus. Generally, if the fetus is destroyed
prior to viability, it is viewed as an extension of the mother, and her damages are assessed
accordingly. See Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884). In a minority
of jurisdictions, the mother's tort action also includes damages for the destruction of a viable
fetus. See, e.g., Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J.
303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d
65 (1969); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964). Allowing the mother to recover for
the loss of the fetus furthers the policy goals of compensation and deterrence; a separate action
by the fetus is unnecessary.
21. See generally Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability
for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325, 332 nn.43 & 44
(1984) (citing authorities prior to Roe that allowed wrongful death suits for prenatal injuries);
see also Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn:
Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1401 (providing
history of "born alive" rule and viability requirements for wrongful death actions stemming
from prenatal injuries). Today, in most jurisdictions, if the fetus is viable when the injury
occurs, or survives to viability and is stillborn as a result of the tortfeasor's conduct, a wrongful
death action lies. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 370. A minority of jurisdictions
allow wrongful death actions stemming from fetal injury only if the child is born alive. See,
e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 580, 565 P.2d 122, 133, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 107 (1977)
(fetus not a person and cannot maintain wrongful death action if stillborn); Hernandez v. Gar-
wood, 390 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 1980) (no action under wrongful death statute for death of viable
fetus stillborn); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Iowa 1983); Group Health
Assoc., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104, 116-19, 453 A.2d 1198, 1207 (1983) (child must be born
alive to recover under wrongful death statute); Kuhnke v. Fisher, 683 P.2d 916, 919 (Mont.
1984) (unborn or stillborn fetus does not qualify under wrongful death statute); Raymond v.
Bartsch, 84 A.D.2d 60, 62, 447 N.Y.S.2d 32, 34 (App. Div. 1981) (reaffirming earlier decisions
not allowing recovery under wrongful death statute for death of a nine month old fetus stillborn).
Similar to the mother's tort action, the wrongful death action is intended to compensate the
parents, who are also victiins. Because the wrongful death action recognizes the independent
legal existence of the stillborn child, damage awards augment those received by the mother in
her tort action. Generally, the defendant in a wrongful death action is liable for the parents'
pecuniary loss, W. PROSSER & IV. KEETON, supra note 19, at 949; RESTATEIENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS 925 (1982), and may be liable for the parents' loss of society or companionship with
the child. See, e.g., White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 533, 458 P.2d 617, 623 (1969) (wrongful death
statute allows recovery for non-pecuniary loss such as loss of society); Sanchez v. Schindler,
651 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. 1983) (court expanded recovery under the wrongful death statute to
include loss of society and mental anguish); Kwaterskl v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
4 Wis. 2d 14, 15, 148 N.W.2d 107, 108 (1967) (recovery for loss of society and companionship
in wrongful death action allowed).
Finally, some jurisdictions allow the parents to recover punitive damages. Alabama is the
only state with a strictly penal wrongful death statute. ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (1985). See also,
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 61 1987
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
child for injuries inflicted on the child during its fetal development.22
State fetal protection laws, such as those mentioned above, survive
constitutional analysis under Roe because they do not unreasonably
burden a woman's abortion decision. But the analysis of fetal rights
since Roe has not been this straightforward.2 Rather than limit Roe
e.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 98, 300 So. 2d 354, 356 (1974) (wrongful death
statute requires recovery for punitive damages only, based on the culpability of the defendant
and the enormity of the harm). Other statutes allow punitive damages in addition to compensatory
damages. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.50 (Baldwin 1985) (in action by the surviving
spouse or child of a person killed with a deadly weapon, "vindictive" damages recoverable);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28a-18-2 (1984) (punitives damages allowed). See generally S. SPEISER,
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (2d ed. 1975 & Supp. 1985) (compilation of wrongful death
statutes state by state). For an excellent recent discussion of the development of wrongful death
actions, see Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L.J. 559 (1985).
22. Most jurisdictions allow such actions regardless of whether the injury occurred prior
to viability. See, e.g., Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1976) (child injured during sixth week of pregnancy); Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725,
187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971) (child injured during fourth month of pregnancy). See generally W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 368. Other courts have expressly rejected the
viability distinction. See Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 505, 93 S.E.2d
727, 728 (1956); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 485, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958); Smith v.
Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 54:3, 125
N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (App. Div. 1953); Sinlder v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960);
Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 78, 220 A.2d. 222, 224 (1966). Several courts have failed to make
a viability distinction when considering prenatal tort actions. See Rodriguez v. Patti, 415 Ill.
496, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 534, 458 P.2d 617, 621 (1969); Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 291, 367 P.2d 835, 838 (1962).
Recovery for prenatal injuries has been permitted in an action against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970). Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp.
465, 469 (E.D.S.C. 1960) (without making a viability distinction, court held that damages may
be obtained by child who was born alive after prenatal injuries were sustained when an army
truck injured the child's mother). Other jurisdictions retain the pre- and post-viability distinction.
See, e.g., Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 572, 651 P.2d 11, 13 (1982) (prenatal tort action
allowed if injury occurred after viability and child born alive); accord Tursi v. New England
Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 248, 111 A.2d 14, 17 (1955); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo.
1224, 1229, 258 S.W.2d 577, 581 (1953); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691,
695 (1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 129, 87 N.E.2d 334, 340
(1949); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 697, 291 P.2d 225, 228 (1955); Shousha v. Matthews
Drivurself Serv., Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 395, 358 S.W.2d 471, 476 (1962). See generally Annotation,
Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, s11pra
note 19, at § 55. Similar to wrongful death actions, in most jurisdictions prenatal tort actions
are premised upon the belief that the fetus is a separate entity entitled to legal protection.
23. Literature in this area evidences the growing concern with defining the rights of the
fetus since Roe. See Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo.
L. REV. 639 (1980); King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection
of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647 (1977); Louisell, supra note 17; Morrison, Torts Involving
[Vol. 39
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to abortion regulation analysis, many courts and legislators have relied
upon Roe to justify decisions and laws that regulate the woman's
pregnancy outside of abortion. For example, some states have attemp-
ted to protect the fetus by bringing it within the reach of child abuse
and neglect laws.2 Given that the viable fetus' interest in life outweighs
the woman's right of privacy, the predominant suggestion is that states
possess broad regulatory power over the fetus. States have attempted
to exercise that power to protect the fetus, not just from abortion,
but from any harm.2 In short, states have attempted to regulate a
the Unbo-rn - A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 131 (1979); Parness, supra note 18;
Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 Mica. L. REV. 1569 (1979); Robertson, supra note 21, at
1404-13.
Courts also are confused. For example, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in dicta,
stated that allowing a wrongful death action against a third-party tortfeasor who negligently
caused the destruction of a pre-viable fetus would be inconsistent with Roe. Wallace v. Wallace,
120 N.H. 675, 679, 421 A.2d 134, 137 (1980) (dicta). Other courts allow prenatal tort actions
without mentioning Roe. See, e.g., Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 380 A.2d 1353 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1977); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977); Shack
v. Holland, 89 Misc. 2d 78, 389 N.Y.S.2d 988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); Labree v. Major, 111 R.I.
657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973). Moreover, since Roe, a growing number of jurisdictions have allowed
the child's prenatal tort suit against the mother even prior to viability. See, e.g., Stallman v.
Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 865, 473 N.E.2d 400, 404 (1984) (prenatal tort action upheld
against mother for injuries sustained by 51/2 month old fetus as a result of mother's negligent
driving); Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 398, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (1981) (court held
mother would be liable for unreasonable use of tetracycline during pregnancy, which caused
discoloring of son's teeth). See generally Beal, supra note 21, at 357 (listing 30 jurisdictions
that would allow prenatal tort actions against the mother). Allowing suits against the mother
is not necessarily inconsistent with Roe. See infra notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text.
Courts and legislatures also seem to be increasingly more concerned and confused about the
limits of state power under Roe to protect the fetus under child abuse and neglect laws. See
infra notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11
(West 1981); see also In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 116, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (1980) (newborn
suffering from narcotics withdrawal symptoms due to prenatal maternal drug addiction is neg-
lected and within jurisdiction of probate court); In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 980, 492 N.Y.2d
331, 334 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1985) ("person" under Family Court Act includes unborn child who is
neglected as a result of mother's conduct); In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935,
939 (Ct. C.P. 1986) (mother's use of heroin close to baby's birth "created substantial risk to the
health of the child" and constituted child abuse). But see Case Against Woman in Baby Death
Thrown Out, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at Y5, col. 3 (statute governing criminal liability for
failure to pay child support does not extend protection to child born brain-damaged as result
of mother's prenatal conduct). See generally Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the
State Intervene?, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1984).
25. In addition to child abuse and neglect statutes, see supra note 24, the state's interest
in protecting the fetus from harm is evident in recent efforts to keep pregnant women out of
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woman's pregnancy in order to protect the fetus' quality of life after
birth.
States that adopt the view that Roe allows them to regulate the
pregnancy beyond abortion add to the confusion over the limits of
state intervention in prenatal caretaking. A careful evaluation of Roe
and its progeny reveals that the Court has not addressed the quality-of-
life issue. Moreover, if one assumes that quality of life becomes a
relevant consideration in state regulation of the woman-fetus relation-
ship, one must also conclude that abortion should remain an option,
at least if the quality of life for the after born child would fall below
an acceptable standard. This view suggests, therefore, that in some
instances Roe's trimester scheme should be relaxed. Finally, if the
viable fetus is to be treated as if it were an infant, general principles
governing the parent-child relationship also would be appropriately
applied to maternal-fetal conflict resolution. These controversial points
raise difficult issues that are explored more fully below.
B. Roe and Quality of Life Principles
1. Assumption: Quality of Life Is Not a State Interest
The primary task of the Roe Court was to establish a framework
that would balance the interests of the various parties in an abortion
decision. The Court expended little energy in describing the state's
interest in the developing fetus. Quite simply, the Court held that the
state is interested in protecting the potential life of the fetus.26 Weigh-
ing the state's interest within the trimester formula, the Court held
that the state's interest did not become compelling until viability.27
The Roe Court defined viability as the point at which the fetus "has
the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."'z While
"meaningful" may connote "qualitatively good," it is likely the Court
meant a viable fetus is a fetus capable of survival outside of the
womb.2 Given the tenor of the Roe opinion, concerned simply with
determining if and when the fetus could be destroyed, it is difficult
to ascribe to the Roe opinion a state interest in the fetus' quality of life.
certain hazardous working environments. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. See generally
Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219
(1986); Timko, Exploring the Limits of Legal Duty: A Union's Responsibilities with Respect to
Fetal Protection Policies, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 159 (1986).
26. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id.; see, e.g., King, supra note 23, at 1656. As Professor King stated:
[Vol. 39
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However, the state has expressed interests in the fetus outside of
those mentioned in Roe. The fetus is protected under property, crim-
inal, and tort laws, all of which reflect state involvement in fetal
protection. Such state laws are legitimate under Roe, however, only
if they do not impose an unreasonable burden on the woman's right
of privacy. Moreover, even assuming the Roe Court implicitly held
that quality of fetal life is not a legitimate state interest in abortion
regulation analysis, property and criminal fetal protection laws would
remain valid. Vesting the fetus with contingent property rights is
irrelevant to the woman's right of privacy. Similarly, holding a defen-
dant, other than the pregnant woman prior to viability, criminally
responsible for destroying the fetus protects the state's interest in
the fetus' potential life. Furthermore, imposition of criminal liability
is consistent with the view that life, regardless of its quality, is better
than being destroyed.
Less clear under the assumption that impaired life is better than
no life, is whether the state could attempt to protect the fetus from
harm by allowing actions against tortfeasors who cause it injury. By
allowing prenatal tort actions, the state is imposing a subtle form of
deterrence on the tortfeasor's conduct, which suggests that the state
has an interest in protecting the fetus from mere harm. Under the
assumption that Roe limits the state's interest to protecting fetal life
and disregards any state interest in the quality of the after born child's
life, recognition of prenatal tort actions appears inconsistent.
However, even under the narrow view that quality of life is not
a state interest, the state may legitimately allow prenatal tort actions
to deter tortious conduct that could possibly destroy the fetus.
Moreover, protecting the fetus from possible destruction as a result
of tortious conduct is only one among many interests the state has in
allowing a suit against a defendant who injures a fetus. For example,
when harm is inflicted by a third party, the state also has an interest
both in protecting the woman's body from injury, and in protecting
her interest in the developing fetus.30 The state wants to insure that
the woman's injuries are compensated by the tortfeasor so she need
not resort to state aid.3 1
It is far more likely that the Court meant the word "meaningful" to exclude
only the class of fetuses that lack the minimal integrative physiological equipment
and therefore could not survive for a significant period of time - more than a
few minutes - if separated from their mothers by existing medical techniques.
Id. (footnote omitted).
30. See supra note 20.
31. See infra note 36.
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Most important, when the woman is not the tortfeasor, Roe has
no relevance at all; her right of privacy is not implicated. Whether
she has an option to abort the fetus has nothing to do with the negligent
injury of her fetus by a third person. At most, if she seeks an abortion
after the alleged tortious fetal injury, the question should be one of
damages suffered by her and the amount of compensation owed to
her under her own tort action.s2 Finally, the defendant should not be
allowed to successfully assert the defense that the woman had a duty
to mitigate damages by aborting a pre-viable fetus. Indeed, if the
defendant's conduct results in loss of the fetus, the woman's damages
may be greater.1 Moreover, under Roe and the assumption that quality
of life is irrelevant, after vidbility the state may prohibit the woman
from choosing abortion, unless an abortion would be necessary to save
her life or health.
Nor should the woman, as tortfeasor, necessarily be immune from
the child's prenatal tort action.3 When the woman harms the fetus,
32. See supra note 20.
33. See supra notes 20 & 21.
34. Historically, the parent was immune from being sued by the child. See Hewlett v.
George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664
(1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). The parent-child tort immunity doctrine
reflected society's fears that allowing such actions would create family discord and undermine
parental decisionmaking and authority to discipline the child. See generally H. CLARK, THE
LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 9.2 (1968); Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine
in Search of Justification, 32 DEF. L.J. 213, 226-27 (1983) (assailing argument that immunity
fosters domestic tranquility and parental authority). Society also feared that suits between the
parent and child might enable the parent to benefit from the wrong, for example, if the parent
survived the child and inherited the child's estate. See, e.g., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242,
245, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905). Also common were fears that if the child recovered a judgment from
the parent, family resources would be depleted to the detriment of all family members. See,
e.g., Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 257, 163 A.2d 147, 150 (1960) (suit by child against
uninsured father could seriously disrupt family's finances). Finally, the parent-child immunity
doctrine was intended to prevent fraudulent claims. See, e.g., id. at 252, 163 A.2d at 150 ("The
risk of collusion is indeed a very great and human one, when the insured's own flesh and blood
and the family pocketbook are concerned."). But see Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 431, 289
P.2d 218, 224 (1955) (child's interest in recovering for tortious injury sufficient to outweigh
danger of fraud or collusion).
As courts and legislators were persuaded that these fears are largely unfounded, the doctrine
began to erode. See generally, Hollister, supra; Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the
Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (1967-68). Thus, while some jurisdictions have abrogated
the doctrine, others limit it and, in particular, continue to immunize from tort liability parents
who act reasonably in disciplining and supervising their children. See Hollister, supra (1983
survey of states' immunity rules); see also Special Project, Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding
[Vol. 39
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the state continues to be interested in assuring that the after born
child receives compensation for its injuries 5 The state's foremost in-
terest is in having the mother pay damages to the child for the con-
sequences of her actions. If she refuses to provide adequate compen-
sation and care for the child she injured during its fetal development,
the child should have a cause of action against her in order to protect
the state's monetary interest.6
Thus far, it appears that Roe has little bearing on state intervention
in the woman-fetus relationship outside of abortion regulation. But an
assumption that the state has no interest in the healthy development
of the fetus can have significant ramifications. It leaves largely unfet-
tered the woman's right of privacy - her right to make independent
decisions affecting her pregnancy outside of the abortion context. For
Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 828-30 (1986) (discussion of recent
cases establishing community standards of reasonable parental conduct) [hereinafter Special
Project].
Rules governing parent-child tort immunity should not vary because the child's injury occur-
red during fetal development. See generally Special Project, supra. The possibility of intrafamilial
conflict as a result of a child's prenatal tort suit against its mother will be the same as in any
other suit by the child against the parent. Just as possible family discord is insufficient reason
to disallow the child's suit in other situations, it also should be insufficient reason to disallow
the prenatal tort action against the mother. Moreover, fear of undermining parental authority
by allowing the child's suit is largely misplaced when the child's action is one for prenatal
injuries. At the time of the injury, it is unlikely that the mother's conduct, whether intentional
or negligent, had anything to do with her role as a disciplinarian. In contrast, the mother's
choices to smoke, or drink, or skydive - activities that may harm the fetus - have a lot to
do with her parental discretion to oversee the fetus' development. By acknowledging prenatal
tort actions against the mother, society would not be attempting to make pregnant women
martyrs or prisoners in their own bodies. A pregnant woman would simply be held to a reasonable
standard of care toward her fetus. A pregnant woman whose conduct evidences an unreasonable
disregard for the fetus' and after born child's welfare should not be immunized from liability
for the harm she causes. Clearly, however, allowing the mother to shield herself from liability
for prenatal injuries she unreasonably causes cannot be justified either on the rationale that
immunity is necessary to preserve family harmony or on the rationale of protecting parental
authority.
35. See, e.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 865, 473 N.E.2d 400, 404 (1984)
(child has right to be compensated for injuries suffered during fetal development as a result of
mother's negligence); Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 399-400, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (1981)
(regardless of identity of tortfeasor, child should be able to recover for injuries inflicted during
fetal development).
36. Similarly, Professor Robertson suggests that the child who is born damaged as a result
of being conceived through certain new reproductive technologies should be able to hold its
parents financially responsible for its injuries so that the burden of rearing the child does not
fall on others. See Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure
of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 992-93 (1986).
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example, the state could not prohibit a pregnant woman from drinldng
alcohol to ensure that the fetus was not born with fetal alcohol syn-
drome.3 7 If the fetus is not aborted in violation of Roe, then the
assumption that the state is not interested in the fetus' quality of life
after birth frees the woman to disregard the fetus' health.3
In short, even assuming that abortion is the worst fate for the
fetus, and that the woman's right of privacy under Roe cannot be
restricted to protect the fetus from mere harm, the state still can
give the fetus some legal recognition. For participants in the abortion
debate and the debate over the state's power to intervene in prenatal
caretaking, however, it is critical to understand and emphasize that
Roe does not raise the quality-of-life issue. Roe addresses only the
proper role of the state in abortion regulation. Reliance upon Roe
outside of that context leads not only to confusion, but may result in
dangerous presumptions about state power to regulate the relationship
between the woman and her fetus.
2. Assumption: Quality of Life Is a State Interest
Roe's failure to address the state's interest in the fetus' quality of
life after birth does not necessarily mean that the state has no interest
37. Children who are born with physical or mental abnormalities as a result of their mothers'
excessive drinking during their pregnancies may suffer from fetal alcohol syndrome. Children
afflicted with the syndrome may evidence growth deficiency, eye and ear irregularities, and
heart defects. These children can also have intellectual handicaps, ranging from severe to mild
mental retardation. See Little & Streissgnth, Effects of Alcohol on the Fetus: Impact and
Prevention, 125 CAN. MED. A.J. 159 (1981).
38. Even under an assumption that the state has an interest in healthy fetal development,
see infra § II.B.2., the state's ability to enforce any regulations upon the pregnant woman prior
to fetal viability would be so limited as to be useless as a practical matter. A woman could opt
out of the scope of any regulations to protect the fetus by terminating the pregnancy through
abortion. In fact, by attempting to force the woman to forego her drinking, smoking, or other
potentially harmful activity, the state actually may be encouraging her to exercise her abortion
option. See Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights with Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 612 n.56 (1986); Robertson, Procrea-
tive Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405,
447 n.129 (1983). A similar concern arises in property law where a woman can avoid sharing
an inheritance with her unborn child by aborting the fetus. Authors Parness and Pritchard
suggest that elimination of the "born-alive" rule in property law would reduce the woman's
incentive to abort and, in turn, augment the state's interest in protecting potential life. Parness
& Pritchard, To Be Or Not To Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potential of Life, 51 CINN. L. REV.
257, 265 (1982). Most jurisdictions, however, continue to follow the "born-alive" rule for estate
distribution purposes. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 367-68. In tort law,
policy reasons for allowing prenatal tort actions against the mother may outweigh the risk that
she will abort to avoid such liability. See supra notes 22, 30-35 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39
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in protecting the fetus' healthy development. Fetal protection laws
such as those in existence even prior to Roe indicate that the state
probably is interested in protecting the fetus from harm for the pur-
pose of enhancing the chances for a high quality of life after birth.
Recent efforts in some states to provide medical and financial assist-
ance to pregnant women,3 9 as well as efforts. to exert control over a
pregnant woman who jeopardizes her fetus, 40 highlight the growing
state interest in healthy fetal development. Proponents of the view
that the state has a legitimate interest in the fetus' quality of life
after birth would argue, probably correctly, that Roe does not set the
outer limits on state power to interfere in the woman's pregnancy.
Having made this general assertion, proponents of the quality-of-
life view may very well fall into two groups, which are not mutually
exclusive. Group one would consist of those people who believe that
Roe's holding is too narrow to resolve non-abortion pregnancy-related
conflicts. Group one members would assert that under Roe, states
39. For example, under Florida's Handicap Prevention Act of 1986, Florida provides com-
prehensive prenatal care to high-risk pregnant women to minimize the possibility of handicapped
children. FLA. STAT. §§ 411.101-.108 (1986). In New York, the Commissioner of the Department
of Social Services promulgated a rule, based on aid to dependent children benefits, which allows
a woman at least four months pregnant to receive benefits for the unborn child. N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 18 § 369.1 (1984). The federal government also provides assistance to states to improve
the quality of prenatal care. See, e.g., Maternal and Child Health Service's Block Grant Program,
42 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (1985) (govermnent funding to provide access to quality maternal and child
health services to low income mothers and children to reduce infant mortality and the incidence
of preventable diseases); Special Supplemental Food Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1986) (provides
supplemental foods and nutrition education to pregnant women, infants and young children from
low income families).
40. See, e.g., State Takes Custody of Baby Addicted to Cocaine, Gainesville Sun, Aug. 30,
1986, at 2C, col. 2 (infant born addicted to cocaine made ward of state until mother agreed to
rehabilitation program). Some lower courts have intervened in women's pregnancies for the
sake of protecting the fetus, but such decisions have been overturned on appeal. For example,
a California juvenile court detained a pregnant woman for two months for psychiatric treatment
under the court's dependency jurisdiction. The woman's petition for habeas corpus relief was
granted, however, because "person" in the juvenile code was held not to include the unborn
fetus. In re Steven S., 178 Cal. Rptr. 525, 528, 126 Cal. App. 3d 23, 29-30 (Ct. App. 1981).
Similarly, a family court judge in Massachusetts ordered a pregnant woman sutured so that
her cervix would hold her fetus. On appeal, the court held that coercing the woman to undergo
the operation did not satisfy a compelling state interest and unconstitutionally interfered with
the woman's right of privacy. Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 333-34, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1983).
But see Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 89, 274 S.E.2d 457, 460
(1981) (Georgia Supreme Court upheld order that woman undergo caesarean section if necessary
at delivery). See generally Bross, Court-Ordered Intervention on Behalf of Unborn Children,
7 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J., Spring 1986, at 15.
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would have to respect the woman's right to choose abortion, but that
states also would be allowed to take a greater interest in prenatal
caretaking. Group two members might agree with those in group one,
but also would assert that Roe's holding is too broad. If quality of life
is truly a legitimate state interest in fetal development, group two
would argue that third-trimester eugenic abortions should be permis-
sible. 41
a. Group One's Position
Proponents of the group one quality-of-life view support their pos-
ition with several arguments. First, they argue that Roe recognizes
the state's interest in the quality of life of the after born child. This
argument is premised upon Roe's ambiguous holding that the viable
fetus, though not a person under the Constitution, can be treated as
one.42 Advancing this argument 43 the balance of interests struck in
Roe would be of limited utility in defining the limits of state interven-
tion to protect the fetus-person from mere harm. For one thing, the
trimester scheme would be useless in determining the validity of reg-
ulations aimed at protecting fetal health. The state's interest in pro-
tecting the quality of the fetus' life would begin, and arguably would
be compelling, even before conception. The state would have an in-
terest in overseeing the conduct of all women capable of child-bearing.
At a minimum, the state's interest would be legitimate once the preg-
nancy becomes known to the woman. Thus, while this view leaves
intact abortion regulation analysis under Roe, the scope of the woman's
right of privacy outside of Roe could be sufficiently curtailed to accom-
modate the state's interest in assuring that the fetus has a chance for
a healthy life after birth 44
A second argument group one advocates is that a woman who
elects to carry a fetus to term waives any right of privacy she might
have in the pregnancy in general.45 Labor laws preventing pregnant
41. Even the Georgia statute challenged in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), companion
case to Roe, permitted abortions when the fetus might be born with severe disabilities. Id. at
183. The Georgia statute was patterned after the American Law Institute MODEL PENAL
CODE, § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), reprinted in 410 U.S. at 205 app. B. See infra
note 54 and accompanying text.
42. See supra text at notes 14-16.
43. The argument that the viable fetus, although not a person, is entitled to constitutional
protection is also the basis for an argument that Roe should be overruled. See infra § III.A.2.
44. Sharp curtailment of the pregnant woman's right of privacy may encourage her to abort
the fetus to protect her autonomy. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
45. See Robertson, supra note 38, at 437-38.
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women from working in hazardous work environments, 46 and prohibi-
tion laws for pregnant women, 47 to list two examples, would appear
to be valid under this view. At its broadest reach, this argument
suggests that whenever a woman harms a fetus she then carries to
term, the state would be able to hold her responsible, either civilly
or criminally, for the consequences of her actions. In addition to com-
pensating the child victim, civil and criminal sanctions would serve to
deter the woman from acting in ways injurious to the fetus. Whatever
the scope of her right of privacy in the pregnancy in general, this
argument suggests that she waived it when she elected to forego an
abortion.
However meritorious these arguments may be,4 8 their open-ended-
ness limits their utility in resolving conflicts between the woman and
46. Although the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)), prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex, whether removal of a pregnant woman from a hazardous
workplace would violate that provision is an open question. See generally Becker, supra note
25; Devereux, Equal Employment Opportunity Under Title VII and the Exclusion of Fertile
Women from the Toxic Workplace, 12 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 164 (1984); Williams,
Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment
Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981). Generally, legislation in this area
is offensive, not simply because of the right of privacy issue, but also because it functions to
keep women in lower paying jobs. Only if employers arranged for pregnant workers to assume
safe positions at comparable pay during their pregnancies would the question of the scope of
the woman's right of privacy with respect to fetal rights be the central focus in litigation
challenging this employment practice. Until then the more immediate issues of sex discrimination
and equal protection for women will continue to receive the most attention. For a recent and
creative discussion of the issues, see Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUm. L. REv. 1118 (1986).
47. See supra notes 37, 38 & 40 and accompanying text.
48. Many commentators find little or no merit to the arguments that the pregnant woman's
privacy rights must succumb to any state interest in the quality of the fetus' life after birth,
or that the woman waives her rights by not getting an abortion. See Beal, supra note 21, at
366-70; Johnsen, supra note 38, at 605-09. Those who believe that a woman has a right to
autonomy during the pregnancy buttress their position by invoking principles of equal protection.
They suggest that because only women can become pregnant, it would be unconstitutional sex
discrimination to restrict the pregnant woman's freedom because she is pregnant. See Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375
(1985); Johnsen, supra note 38, at 620-24; Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 955, 1008-11 (1984); Regan, supra note 23, at 1618-45 (1979). But see Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Geduldig Court held that the California disability insurance
system, which provided for private employees temporarily disabled by an injury or an illness
and covered by worker's compensation, did not violate the equal protection clause by excluding
the risk of disability from a normal pregnancy. Id. at 497. The equal protection clause does not
require a totally comprehensive program that would be considerably more costly to the state.
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the fetus. For example, it is plausible to suggest that the state may
curtail a woman's right of privacy under the quality-of-life view be-
cause Roe implicitly says so, or because the woman unwittingly says
so by not getting an abortion. The critical questions remain: How
much can the state curtail her privacy right? To what extent does a
woman waive her right of privacy by choosing to carry the fetus to
term? It is one thing for a state to hold a woman accountable for the
harm she causes to her baby who is born with fetal alcohol syndrome.
It is quite another matter to restrict that woman's freedom to drink
during her pregnancy. Answers to these constitutional questions are
not lurking in Roe and its progeny.
The strongest argument group one can make is to persuade the
community to acknowledge that the state has an interest in assuring
healthy fetal development, and to convince courts and legislators to
separate general pregnancy health care decisionmaking from abortion
regulation analysis. 49 This argument does not try to divine a state
interest in healthy fetal development from Roe and its progeny, o
Nor does it skirt the underlying question about the state's interest in
healthy fetal development by implementing a broad waiver theory
Id. at 495. The state has a legitimate interest in maintaining the self-supporting nature of the
insurance program and in keeping the cost to participating employees low. Id. at 496. These
state interests provide an objective and non-discriminatory basis for the state's decision to
exclude a particular group. Id.
49. See Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits of State Intervention
in Prenatal Choice, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19 (1985). Dr. Mathieu suggests that the right
to an abortion is independent of the pregnant woman's responsibilities to her future child. "It
is not true that the right to have an abortion implies the right to refuse to provide medical
treatment to the fetus. It is also not true that an obligation to undergo this treatment would
imply an obligation to forego an abortion." Id. at 32 (emphasis in original); see also In re Ruiz,
27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ct. App. 1986) (woman's right to abortion pre-viability
is protected, but post-viability, the fetus should be considered a child for purposes of child abuse
and neglect statute and mother can be held responsible for abusing the fetus).
50. Ironically, the same line of cases is used both to broaden and to restrict the woman's
right of privacy. The nebulous nature of Roe is at least partially responsible for the uncertainty
in this area. In upholding the woman's right to choose abortion, the Roe Court relied upon a
line of cases that upheld such rights as the right to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); the right to
use contraceptives, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and the right to privacy in family
relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters,
168 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Roe, 410 U.S. at
152-53.
At one extreme are those who suggest that this line of cases does not even support Roe's
holding that the right of privacy includes the right to choose abortion. See Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due
[VCol. 39
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under Roe. Rather, group one asserts that distinguishing prenatal
care decisions from abortion regulation makes apparent the need to
strike a balance between the rights of the woman and the fetus outside
of abortion, and the state's interest in the fetus outside of abortion.
Thus, in determining the validity of various state laws affecting the
pregnancy outside of abortion, the question is not whether such laws
violate Roe, but whether they violate the woman's right of privacy.5 1
Asking this question should help to clarify the ensuing analysis. Some
regulations will unconstitutionally encroach on the woman's right of
privacy; for example, prohibiting pregnant women from drinking any
alcohol in the absence of medical data indicating that a total prohibition
is necessary to protect fetal health. In contrast, this argument may
also permit criminal or civil sanctions upon a woman whose child is
born with fetal alcohol syndrome.52
b. Group Two's Position
Members of group two believe the state has an interest in the
fetus' quality of life, but concede that in some cases a life may be of
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159; Schneider, Moral
Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1863-70
(1985). Others conclude that the right of privacy to choose abortion under Roe does not preclude
the state from protecting the fetus from mere harm. See King, supra note 23, at 1663-64 (state
can balance woman's right of privacy with degree of intrusiveness of state regulation aimed at
protecting fetus from mere harm); Mathieu, svpra note 49, at 34-39; Parness & Pritchard, supra
note 38, at 298; Robertson, supra note 38, at 437-50; Note, Constitutional Limitations on State
Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1057-61 (1981). But see Myers, supra
note 24 (state intervention unlikely unless great harm or death is imminent). Finally, some
commentators interpret this line of cases to fortify the woman's right to autonomy to make all
critical decisions during her pregnancy. See, e.g., Nelson, Buggy, & Weil, Forced Medical
Treatmaent of Pregnant Women: "Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest," 37
HASTINGS L.J. 703, 749-62 (1986) (suggesting that the pregnant woman's right of privacy under
Roe and its progeny supersedes any interest the fetus might have in certain medical procedures).
51. When the woman assumes parental status, her right of privacy to oversee the child's
development is not unlimited. Thus constitutional doctrine in the parent-child relationship also
must be considered. See i fra § II.C.
52. See infra § II.C. Professor Robertson suggests that a state could easily prohibit a
pregnant woman's activities, like drinking or using drugs, that might harm a viable fetus. State
laws prohibiting such harmful activity would be constitutional, he continues, because a woman
has no fundamental right to use such substances. A state, therefore, would not need to show
a compelling state interest to restrict the use of alcohol or drugs by a pregnant woman.
Robertson, supra note 38, at 442-43. See generally Parness, The Duty to Prevent Handicaps:
Laws Promoting the Prevention of Handicaps to Newborns, 5 IW. NEw ENG. L. REV. 431
(1983) (suggesting that laws should protect the fetus from abusive acts by parents and that
cease and desist orders could be placed on parents to stop abuse). Fetal protection laws that
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such poor quality that it is not worth living.- Group two takes excep-
tion to Roe's proscription of third trimester abortions when the
woman's life is not jeopardized. Group two contends that abortion
should be available to a woman who becomes aware of certain defects
in her fetus during the third trimester.
Group two members carry a higher burden of persuasion; like pro-
choice advocates in the abortion debate, they must overcome general
religious and moral beliefs in our society that life is to be preserved
at any cost. Moreover, the philosophy that death is preferable to living
a life of a certain quality has not received explicit Supreme Court
sanction. Decisions by the Court in at least two other areas, however,
evidence a growing tendency to accept the belief that dying is not
always worse than living. For example, implicit in the Court's holding
that the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment,5 is an
assumption that some forms of punishment are more cruel and unusual
than death s The Supreme Court has acknowledged that death may
would pass constitutional scrutiny may nevertheless be sufficiently onerous to an individual
woman and encourage her to abort. See supra note 38. Policy reasons, therefore, may cause
the state to forego imposition of valid restrictions upon pregnant women.
53. Professor Goldstein uses the term 'not a life worth living" in an attempt to circumscribe
state power over private health care decisions involving the parent and child. Because quality
of life is a subjective determination, he suggests that death should be an option for a patient
when (1) no proven medical procedure exists, or (2) parents receive conflicting medical advice
about which treatment procedure to follow, or (3) nonexperimental treatment will probably not
enable the child to pursue either a life worth living or a life of relatively normal healthy growth
toward adulthood. Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of
Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 653 (1977); see also Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for
Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life Counts, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283 (1985) (discussing
quality of life decisions and proposing guidelines based on the child's potential for human interac-
tion); Robertson, supra note 36, at 988 (suggesting that it might wrong a child to allow birth
to occur if the child's life will be filled with pain or suffering).
54. See supra note 41. See generally Note, Genetic Screening, Eugenic Abortion, and Roe
v. Wade: How Viable is Roe's Viability Standard?, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 113 (1983) (suggesting
that the state's interests are never compelling enough to prevent the abortion of a severely
defective fetus).
55. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). Gregg is the first case the Court heard on
the death penalty after it struck down the use of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972). The Gregg Court held that the reformulated Georgia statute imposing the death
penalty did not violate the eighth amendment. 428 U.S. at 173. The majority articulated a two-
pronged inquiry to determine if a certain form of punishment was "excessive" and therefore
violated the eighth amendment. First, the punishment cannot involve unnecessary infliction of
punishment. Second, the punishment must be in proportion to the severity of the crime. Id.
The Court concluded that the death penalty as applied in Gregg was not "unconstitutionally
severe" and was not '"nvariably disproportionate to the crime." Id. at 187.
56. Only Justices Marshall and Brennan, dissenting in Gregg, found that the death penalty
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not be the most intolerable fate of a criminal defendant.
More directly on point is the Court's recent decision in Bowen v.
American Hospital AssociationF7 that struck down the Baby Doe reg-
ulations.r In Bowen, the Court analyzed the validity of federal regu-
lations that made it unlawful to refuse to treat certain defective new-
borns, solely on the basis of their handicaps, if they were otherwise
qualified to receive medical treatment. 59 Absent parental consent for
the treatment, the newborn would not be "otherwise qualified" within
the meaning of the regulations.6 The Court struck down the regula-
tions, inter alia, because decisions not to treat are usually a matter
of parental discretion. If the parents' choice is professionally accept-
able, then it controls.61 According to the Bowen decision, a profession-
ally accepted choice could be not to treat, even if death of the newborn
results.
Support can be found among state courts and legislatures for the
philosophy that quality of life is a legitimate state interest.6 Wrongful
birth claims are premised on the theory that if the parents had known
about certain defects in the fetus, then the fetus would have been
aborted.r-' Similarly, "Natural Death Acts," which allow patients to
was cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting), id. at 241 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
57. 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
58. Much has been written on Baby Jane Doe and the federal regulations governing treat-
ment of handicapped newborns. For a recent and insightful examination of some of the issues,
see Symposium: Issues in Procreational Autonomy, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 697 (1986).
59. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2105-07.
60. Id. at 2114.
61. Id. at 2113 n.13 (quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 212-
14 (1983)); see also, Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient: Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 Am. J.
L. & MED. 1, 26-27 (1983) (parents' right to choose course of treatment should be respected
unless it clearly is not in child's best interest).
62. 106 S. Ct. at 2106 n.4.
63. A recent case that received national attention is Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986). In Bouvia, a 28-year old competent quadriplegic
who suffered from cerebral palsy since birth wished not to be fed through a nasogastric tube,
the only method of feeding her. Withdrawal of the tube presented a life-threatening situation
for the patient. Nevertheless, the court held that her right to refuse such treatment was a
fundamental right protected by both the California and the United States Constitutions. 179
Cal. App. 3d at 1138, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301; see also, In re Qulnlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(1975) (father of comatose woman allowed to assert her right to refuse lifesaving treatment),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See generally Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death,
71 CORNELL L. REV. 850 (1986).
64. Most jurisdictions that have confronted the question whether wrongful birth actions
should be recognized have allowed parents to recover for the harm they suffer if the child is
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refuse life-saving medical treatment, support the position that in some
circumstances death may be better than life.? Assuming an acceptable
procedure for implementing such decisions,6 proponents of the group
two quality-of-life view would argue that the philosophy should be
equally applicable to the unborn child, regardless of its stage of fetal
development.
born less than healthy. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 432, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (1979);
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (1978);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d
766, 776, 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (1975) (cases allowing parents to sue for birth of defective child
they would have aborted but for the physician's negligence). See generally Beal, supra note 21;
Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of Action-Suggestions for a Consistent
Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 611 (1980). In contrast, most jurisdictions refuse to acknowledge
wrongful life claims brought by children who would not have been born absent the physician's
negligence. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 25, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1976) ("This
Court cannot weigh the value of life with impairments against the nonexistence of life itself.");
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 773, 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (1975) (inability to
measure damages under wrongful life claim compels its disallowance). But see Curlender v.
Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980) (court upheld
wrongful life claim because "reality of the 'wrongful-life' concept is that such a plaintiff both
exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others"); Robertson, supra note 36, at 988 ("If the
damage that is inextricably linked to conception or birth is so severe, so fraught with pain and
suffering, that the child might find death preferable, then it might wrong the child to allow
birth to occur at all."). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 370-71.
65. California became the first state to pass a Natural Death Act. The Act allows a terminally
ill adult to give the doctor a directive to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical care. It
includes carefully articulated definitions of the kind of patient covered by the Act and the
requirements for filing the directive. A specifically worded directive is also included. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West 1986). Other states have adopted similar legis-
lation. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801-04 (1981); IDAHO CODE §§ 394501 to -4508 (1985);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1983). See generally, Comment, The Right to Die - A
Current Look, 30 Loy. L. REv. 139 (1984); Comment, A Proposed Amendment to the California
Natural Death Act to Assume the Statutory Right to Control Life Sustaining Treatment Deci-
sions, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 579 (1983).
66. Deciding the "right" course of treatment is especially difficult when the patient, for
whatever reasons, cannot express his or her views. By necessity, the next of kin or a legal
representative must actually make the decision. In the case of minors, generally the parents
decide. Their choice of treatment, moreover, is usually respected if it comports with the medical
advice given to them. See supra notes 57-62 & 65 and accompanying text.
One of the most objectionable aspects of injecting a quality-of-life factor into health care
decisionmaking is that it makes the decision subjective and opens up the possibility for abuse.
However, medical professionals do not have unlimited discretion in suggesting alternative courses
of treatment. Their options are limited by the particular case and by ethical and professional
standards. On March 15, 1986, The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American
Medical Association adopted the position that when the physician's commitments to relieve
suffering and sustain life conflict, the choices of the family or legal representative should prevail.
See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1141, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 (Ct. App.
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Treating the viable fetus as a person, even though not a constitu-
tional person under Roe, provides the basis for group two's argument,
just as it did for group one. The argument essentially claims that Roe
made the state the decisionmaker in choosing between abortion and
continuing the pregnancy during the last trimester when the woman's
life is not jeopardized. Even if quality of life considerations were
knowingly factored into the decision, the choice between the potential
life or death of the fetus remains. Significantly, however, the analysis
could shift the decisionmaking authority. Because Roe implies that
the viable fetus is worth treating as a person, it is appropriate to
draw upon principles governing similar life and death decisions with
an after born child. Generally, in such critical situations, the parents,
not the state, are the primary decisionmakers for the child.67 There-
fore, the critical question becomes whether the state should continue
to be the decisionmaker or whether the decision should reside with
the woman. As discussed below, the woman, as mother, generally
would be the decisionmaker with respect to the abortion decision.
The discussion thus far has demonstrated the futility of relying
upon Roe to resolve all conflicts between the pregnant woman and
the fetus. The question whether a state can permissibly intervene in
a woman's pregnancy for the purpose of enhancing the after born
child's quality of life raises difficult issues about the scope of the
woman's right of privacy. While it seems perfectly reasonable to sup-
pose that the state has an interest in protecting fetal development for
the purpose of enhancing the quality of the after born child's life,
abortion must remain an option once quality of life becomes a relevant
consideration. Moreover, the woman generally should retain decision-
making authority over the abortion decision throughout the pregnancy.
The extent to which her authority would be limited during the third
trimester should be determined, not by principles governing abortion
regulation, but rather by principles governing the parent-child re-
lationship.
C. Roe and Parental Decisionnaking Authority
Abortion regulation analysis essentially ignores the woman's ma-
ternal bond with the fetus. The Roe Court described the role of the
pregnant woman in the abortion decision as that of an independent
1986); see also Rhoden, supra note 53, at 1342-43; Shapiro & Barthel, Infant Care Review
Committees: An Effective Approach to the Baby Doe Dilemma?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 827 (1986)
(articles suggesting use of ethics committees to review difficult cases).
67. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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woman whose right of privacy, at least prior to viability, entitles her
to choose whether or not to become a mother. However, for purposes
of non-abortion decisionmaking or post-viability abortion decisionmak-
ing, choices become more complicated. At what point in the pregnancy
is a woman not only an individual, but also the mother of the fetus
she is carrying? This question, unanswered by Roe, is important be-
cause the state may be able to impose on the fetus' mother respon-
sibilities that would otherwise infringe upon her independence.8 Yet,
as mother of the fetus, the pregnant woman may at the same time
assume a position of authority over the state with respect to certain
decisions affecting the fetus' development.
Principles governing the mother-child relationship, 69 therefore, may
68. By assuming the role of the fetus' mother, arguably the woman waives some of her
privacy rights outside of abortion, thereby weakening any contention that certain state regula-
tions are an unreasonable burden upon her. Even if the state's imposition of duties and obligations
upon the mother can be supported by a waiver theory, foregoing rights for the sake of the
fetus by assuming parental status should be distinguished from a general waiver of the right
to get an abortion under Roe. Roe does not provide principles governing the mother's relationship
to the fetus that is not aborted. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text. Moreover, a
simple application of a waiver theory fails to consider the amount of constitutional protection
the woman might be entitled to as mother of the fetus if such principles were applied to the
mother-fetus relationship. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
69. This article focuses upon the mother and the fetus. A legitimate question arises, how-
ever, about the father's rights in prenatal care decisionmaking. In Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Court reviewed the validity of a statute that required a
woman's husband's consent before she could obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs-appellants argued that
a spousal consent requirement was designed to give the woman's husband ultimate veto power
over her abortion decision, whether or not he was the father of the fetus. Id. at 68-69. The
Court noted that the questions of spousal consent, as well as consent by the father or the
parents of the unmarried minor, were left open in Roe and Doe. Id. at 69. The Danforth Court
struck down the spousal consent requirement. Id. The Court noted the importance of the abortion
decision to the husband and described the importance of the marital relationship. Id. 69-72.
Throughout its discussion of the invalidity of the spousal consent requirement, the Court used
general language, only once suggesting its decision extended beyond the spouse to other persons:
"[T]he State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent
abortion during [the first trimester]." (emphasis added). Id. at 69. It is unclear whether the
Court intended to include within the phrase, "any particular person," the father of the fetus.
However, the Court subsequently addressed the scope of parents' rights to veto or participate
in their minor daughter's abortion decision, notwithstanding the general language in Danforth.
Id. at 72-75. Moreover, the Danforth Court itself left open the question whether a parental
consent requirement for immature minors would be constitutional. Id. at 75. This question
remained unanswered until Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Given the uncertainty sur-
rounding parental rights after Danforth, the one general phrase in Danforth cannot be presumed
to have settled the question of the father's rights in the woman's abortion decision.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have not addressed the scope of the father's right to
participate in the abortion decision, or of the husband's/father's rights in the pregnancy in
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be relevant to the woman/mother-fetus relationship. 70 State power to
intervene in the mother-child relationship following birth is constitu-
tionally limited71 and can take one of two forms. Relying upon its
police power, the state can regulate the mother's or the child's conduct
to protect and promote the public's welfare.7z State intervention into
the mother-child relationship also is permissible under the state's pa-
rens patriae power. 3 Intervention based upon the parens patriae doc-
general. If the woman's right of privacy is more important than the state's or the husband's
interests in the abortion decision, presumably it also would override the father's. Although the
Court has upheld the father's fundamental right to enjoy his relationship with his children, see,
e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972) (father's liberty interest in relationship with
his children born out of wedlock entitled to due process protection), recent decisions indicate a
trend to place less importance on the biological bond, and more significance on the psychological
ties between the parent and child. Compare Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S.
816, 846-47 (1977) ("Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family as an
institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated when the proposed removal from the
foster family is to return the child to his natural parents.") with Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S.
248, 248 (1983) (unwed father must demonstrate "a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood" before he has right under due process to veto adoption) and Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1979) (unwed father who has "come forward to participate in the rearing
of his child" is given right to veto adoption). For an excellent analysis of this line of cases, see
Note, Lehr v. Robertson: Procedural Due Process and Putative Fathers' Rights, 33 DEPAUL
L. REV. 393 (1984).
The Court's de-emphasis on the biological relationship, coupled with the weight of the woman's
right of privacy under Roe, diminishes the father's chances of having protectable rights in the
pregnancy. Thus, in disputes between the mother and father in which the state has no real
interest, the woman's decision, as a practical matter, would always control. See infra note 87
and accompanying text for a discussion of how overruling Roe might affect this analysis.
70. Professor Tribe suggests that Roe itself can be justified upon principles of role-allocation
between the mother and state. See Tribe, Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-50 (1973).
71. The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the right of the parent to oversee
the child's upbringing. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents"); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 168
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (parents "have the right, coupled with the high duty" to care for the child).
See generally Rush, The Warren and Burger Courts on State, Parent, and Child Conflict
Resolution: A Comparative Analysis and Proposed Methodology, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 461 (1985).
72. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (child labor laws proper
exercise of state's police power); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 394 (1923) (compulsory
education laws proper exercise of state's police power); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 24-25 (1905) (state lav requiring vaccination against smallpox upheld under state's police
power); see also infra note 74 (discussion of parens patriae doctrine). But see Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1975) (state's police power insufficient to proscribe drive-in
movie theatre's exhibition of films depicting nudity when films are viewable from public streets).
73. The doctrine of parens patriae originated in England and derives from the King's royal
prerogative as guardian of infants, lunatics and others with legal disabilities. 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
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trine is justified when the state needs to assume the role of substitute
parent because of parental unfitness. 74
Roe's trimester scheme for abortion regulation analysis arguably
fits the constitutional paradigm for allocating decisionmaking authority
between the state and the parent with respect to the child. For exam-
ple, Roe suggests that the woman does not assume the status of
mother prior to viability. The woman is therefore free to treat the
fetus with any degree of care. The state's police or parens patriae
powers would not provide justification for intervening into her life to
protect the fetus. However, post-viability, Roe arguably imposes ma-
ternal status on the woman and a decision to abort a viable fetus
causes the state to be alarmed. Under its police power, state interest
in preserving life would justify usurpation of the mother's abortion
decision. Alternatively, the argument could conclude that any mother
who would destroy her viable fetus is unfit and, therefore, state inter-
vention under the parens patriae doctrine would be justified.
This analysis, although accurately applied to Roe, suffers from
some of the same deficiencies apparent in the Roe decision. First, it
is based upon the premise that the state has an interest only in the
fetus' potential life, and not its quality of life after birth. Second, it
concludes that the woman loses her right of privacy to abort the fetus
after viability. But a woman may intend to carry her pregnancy to
term, and not exercise her right to have an abortion under Roe. If
so, when in her pregnancy does her maternal bond with the fetus
make her the mother for decisionmaking purposes? Would her author-
ity as mother be broader or narrower than her right as an independent
woman to make non-abortion decisions with respect to her pregnancy?
Third, how are such factors as the mother's love, affection, and concern
for the fetus' welfare to be measured against the state's interest in
the fetus' potential life? Finally - that recurring question at the heart
of the controversy - does the state have an interest in protecting
the fetus from mere harm to ensure its chances for a healthy life after
COMMENTARIES *47. See generally Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27
EMORY L.J. 195 (1978).
74. In American jurisprudence, parens patriae traditionally has been limited to cases in
which the parent has failed, either through abuse or neglect, to care for the child. See, e.g.,
Schall v. Martin, 106 S. Ct. 2403, 2410 (1984) ("if parental control falters, the State must play
its part as parens patriae"); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767 n.17 (1982) ("Any parens
patriae interest in terminating the natural parents' rights arises only at the dispositional phase,
after the parents have been found unfit"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-34 (1972)
(unless parents' decisions to withdraw children from school 'Jeopardize[d] [the children's] health
or safety," state's reliance on parens patriae power is misplaced).
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birth? If so, how is that interest to be measured against the mother's
when the state and the mother disagree on matters of prenatal care?
Assuming that both the woman, as mother, and the state have
legitimate interests in the healthy development of the fetus, the al-
location of decisionmaking power between them is much more complex
than a simple application of those principles to Roe might suggest.
Consider when it would be appropriate, under the assumption that
quality of life matters, for the state to invoke its police power to
regulate the pregnancy. With or without Roe, the state's interest in
protecting the fetus from mere harm should not automatically vest
decisionmaking authority in the state. If Roe's holding that the fetus
is not a constitutional person means the fetus is not entitled to any
protection with respect to non-abortion pregnancy decisions, then the
state's police power over the fetus would be less than it is over a
child, a constitutional person.7 Accordingly, the woman's discretion
to regulate her pregnancy would be broader than her discretion to
direct the upbringing of her child after birth.76
But the Court's treatment of the constitutional status of the fetus
is ambiguous, and the discussion thus far has not been constrained to
interpret that part of Roe as forbidding state intervention in other
pregnancy decisions. In fact, the state probably does have an interest
in fetal protection laws. To provide a thorough analysis, assume that
the state's interest in the fetus' development is just as strong as its
interest in the child's welfare. If the state's interest can be elevated
to this degree, then the woman's interest, as mother, deserves as
much consideration. When a conflict arises between the state and the
mother, the state must be able to justify as reasonable any regulation
aimed at protecting the fetus from harm. To pass constitutional
scrutiny, general welfare legislation governing fetal protection should
factor in the mother's interest, but must also overcome whatever
75. The Burger Court, however, made clear that children are not entitled to the same
constitutional protections as adults. See generally Rush, supra note 71, at 470-72.
76. One could argue the opposite, taking the position that the pregnant woman is not a
mother until birth of the fetus, and that therefore, the constitutional principles protecting her
from unreasonable state interference do not apply during the pregnancy. Even accepting this
as true, the woman's right of privacy provides strong protection from state interference with
her autonomy, at least prior to viability. Moreover, although the degree to which her privacy
rights actually protect her autonomy in non-abortion regulation analysis is an open question,
the assumption that she is concerned with the fetus' healthy development should fortify any
rights she has with respect to maldng independent decisions affecting the fetus. The fact that
the state has a similar interest should -hot automatically mean that it, and not the woman,
should be the primary decisionmaker.
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privacy rights the mother retains as an individual under the Constitu-
tion. A state regulation that all pregnant women must drink three
glasses of milk daily might be reasonable, assuming the consumption
of milk was medically necessary to healthy fetal development and all
women had the means to obtain the milk. On the other hand, a state
regulation that a pregnant woman see a physician every three weeks
may be unreasonable, assuming the medical benefits were relatively
minimal.
Similarly, invocation of the state's parens patriae power under the
quality-of-life view must also be justifiable. During the pregnancy,
the woman may place the fetus at risk. For example, the woman may
consume alcohol in such quantity that the after born child suffers from
fetal alcohol syndrome. No one would disagree that a woman who
abuses her child to that extent is an unfit mother. Removing the child
from the mother after birth, then, would be justifiable. But could the
state intervene prior to birth and attempt to detoxify the mother for
the sake of the fetus?
As a practical matter, Roe protects the woman's right to abuse
the fetus, or at least the pre-viable fetus she intends to abort. Short
of asking a woman her intentions, which could always change, the
only evidence that she intends to become a mother is for her not to
get an abortion. Once the abortion option is lost to the woman under
Roe, the state's power under the quality-of-life view arguably would
enable it to intervene in the pregnancy when the fetus is being abused,
based upon the woman's unfitness to be a mother.7
Application of mother-child principles to the viable fetus, however,
also demonstrates the overbreadth of Roe. The woman/mother who
has not aborted the fetus and discovers during the third trimester
that the fetus will be born with certain defects should have an option
to abort it. Not even the Baby Doe regulations struck down in Bowen
attempted to override the parents' decision not to treat some new-
borns.78 The pregnant woman/mother, absent unfitness, should be
given as much authority over her fetus.
77. See supra notes 23, 24 & 40 and accompanying text; see also Shaw, Conditional Prospec-
tive Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63 (1984). Dr. Shaw writes: "A woman's right to
abuse her own body and threaten her own health should not extend to the body of her fetus.
In addition to criminal sanctions, punitive damages for these intentional torts should be vigorously
pursued by the child's next friend." Id. at 104. Dr. Shaw includes alcohol and drug abuse within
conduct that should be deterred. Id.; see also Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: The Right
of a Child Against Its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 582, 607 (1976) (woman should be liable
for injuries inflicted upon fetus as result of her "gross negligence").
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Thus, the validity of fetal protection laws assuming that quality of
life matters will depend upon establishing a framework for analyzing
the competing interests between the state and the woman/mother.
While mother-child principles seem relevant and would be helpful in
resolving conflicts between the state and the mother over fetal de-
velopment, as of today, the Court has not attempted to fill the void
left by Roe by applying those principles to general pregnancy regula-
tion.
III. LIMITS OF STATE INTERVENTION WITHOUT ROE
In overruling Roe, the Supreme Court might choose among three
possible rationales to justify its decision. Bestowing constitutional per-
sonhood on the fetus is one alternative. Second, the Court might hold
that the woman's right of privacy does not protect her independent
decisionmaking authority over questions relating to her pregnancy.
Third, the Court could hold that the right of privacy does not protect
the woman's right to choose abortion. An exploration of the relation-
ship among the three rationales highlights the consequences of choos-
ing one over the others.
A. The Fetus as Person
Several constitutional amendments have been proposed that would
make the fetus a person.79 Although they have failed to pass, the
Court nevertheless could decide that the fetus, like other persons, is
protected by the fourteenth amendment. Implicit within this holding
78. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. But see Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (mother of viable fetus forced to undergo
caesarean section to save the fetus despite objections that such intervention violated her rights
of privacy and religious freedom). See generally Annas, Forced Caesareans: The Most Unkindest
Cut of All, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1982, at 16; Nelson, Buggy, & Weil, supra note 50.
79. For example, the Human Life Amendment, known also as the Garn-Obserstar Amend-
ment, provided in part: "Section 2. No unborn person shall be deprived of life by any person:
Provided, however, that nothing in this article shall prohibit a law permitting only those medical
procedures required to prevent the death of the mother." S.J. Res. 17, H.R.J. Res. 62, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See generally, Westfall, Beyond Abortion: The Potential Reach of a
Hun, Life Amendment, 8 Ai. J.L. & MED. 97, 97-102 (1982). The most recent attempts by
Congress to overrule Roe have been amendments to the Civil Rights Act proposing to protect
the lives of unborn human beings. Several Senate bills introduced in early 1985 were sent to
the Judiciary Committee. S. 46, S. 504, S. 522, 99th Cong., st Sess. (1985). The House bills,
proposing to enact the "Preborn Children's Civil Rights Act of 1985," were also introduced in
early 1985 and have been sent to the Committee. H.R. 555, H.R. 2287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985).
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is the decision that the right of privacy to choose abortion does not
exist. ° As a "person," the fetus would be entitled to be treated in
the same manner as all other persons. With the possible exception of
eugenic abortions, an abortion would be permissible only when neces-
sary to save the life of someone else; that is, when it constituted
justifiable homicide.,sl
By ascribing constitutional status to the fetus, the Court would
also be adopting, at least implicitly, the quality-of-life view. Thus, the
fetus would be within the reach of the state's police power along with
born persons. The state's power to regulate the pregnant woman's
conduct for the sake of protecting the fetus might be quite broad
under this view. 2 If children were allowed to sue their parents for
negligence, then the after born child's right to be treated equally
would allow it to bring a prenatal tort action for injuries it sustained
while in utero that were caused by the mother's negligence. Under
its police power, the state could prohibit the pregnant woman from
working in certain hazardous workplaces without fear of infringing
upon her right of privacy. 3 States might even have to enforce, through
their criminal laws, the fetus' right to be free of another person's,
including the mother's, wanton and willful disregard for its safety 4
In fact, the state's power to protect the fetus might be even broader
than its power to protect adults, just as it is with minors. 5
80. Overruling Roe because the right of privacy does not extend to the abortion decision,
however, has different ramifications from a holding that the fetus is a person. See infra § III, B.
81. See Regan, supra note 23, at 1611-18.
82. See Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abortion
Controversy, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 107, 111-14 (1982).
83. Equal protection principles might protect the woman to a limited degree from losing
pay or seniority. See supra notes 25 & 46.
84. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 113 (suggesting that abortion would have to
be punished as homicide to withstand challenges that a lesser penalty denied the fetus of equal
protection). At least one state already criminalizes the reckless destruction of a viable fetus by
the mother. See Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E. 2d 1324 (1984) (mother charged
with vehicular homicide when her reckless driving caused fetus' death); see also Dead Baby's
Mother Faces Criminal Charge on Acts in Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at A22, col.
1 (mother arrested and charged with failure to provide necessary medical care to fetus who
died as a result of her omission). But see Case Against Woman in Baby Death Thrown Out,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at Y5, col. 3 (statute governing criminal liability for failure to pay
child support inappropriate means to hold mother criminally liable for child born brain-damaged
as result of mother's prenatal drug abuse). Holding the mother criminally responsible when her
conduct causes the viable fetus to die is consistent with treating the pregnant woman as the
fetus' mother. See infra notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) ("States are entitled to greater
leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children."); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
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The implicit assumption that the state has an interest in the fetus-
person's quality of life would not necessarily support a prohibition on
all abortions. If the right of privacy entitled anyone to choose death
over a life not worth living, an increasingly accepted possibility, then
presumably this option would have to be available to all persons,
including the fetus-person. Unfortunately, holding that the fetus is a
person under the Constitution does not directly answer the question
of whether impaired life is better than no life at all.
Finally, if Roe is overruled because the fetus is a person who
deserves constitutional protection, then the woman also becomes the
fetus' mother who, in turn, has the constitutional right in that role
to oversee the fetus' development.8 As guardian of all persons who
are unable to help themselves, however, the state would be justified
622, 635-37 (1978) (parental control over child subject to state regulations that serve public
interest). See generally Rush, supra note 71.
86. See supra notes 57-62 & 66 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. The man who impregnates the woman
(and declares paternity) also immediately becomes the father of the fetus once the fetus becomes
a person under the Constitution. Questions regarding the scope of his right to participate in
decisions that affect the fetus' development would need to be addressed also. See supra note
69. Analogizing from recent Supreme Court decisions involving born children, the amount of
due process the father of the fetus would be entitled to would depend upon his involvement
with the fetus. Establishing a relationship with an unborn child is difficult. Being married to
the mother is one possible way of demonstrating a commitment to the child. Of course, at
common law, the husband of the mother was presumed to be the father of the child, and most
states have codified this presumption. H. CLARK, supra note 34, at 156. Whether this presump-
tion, especially if it is irrebuttable, remains valid after the abortion cases is an open question.
See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 252 (1983). The
father might also contribute financially or emotionally to the mother's care during the term of
the pregnancy. At the other extreme, the father who takes no interest in the pregnancy at all
will have little justification for arguing that his right to make decisions on behalf of the fetus
should be respected.
Two recent stories illustrate how an analysis of the father's rights might proceed if the fetus
were a constitutional person. In both stories, the pregnant women were comatose and not
married to the fathers of the fetuses. See Brain-Dead Woman Gives Birth, Washington Post,
July 31, 1986, at A16, col. 2; Baby Is Weak After Birth to Brain-Dead Woman, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 16, 1986, at 6Y, col. 5. However, in one case, the father, Mr. Poole, was engaged to the
mother. Washington Post, July 31, 1986, at A16, col. 2. In the other case, the mother was
married to another man, Mr. Piazzi. Mr. Piazzi did not contest the paternity of the child by its
alleged father, Mr. Hadden. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1986, at 6Y, col. 5.
Mr. Poole and Mr. Hadden each wanted the mother of his child continued on life support
systems until the fetus could survive outside of her womb. The mother's parents resisted Mr.
Poole's request. Gainesville Sun, July 31, 1986, at 4A. Mr. Piazzi, the mother's husband, resisted
Mr. Hadden's request. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1986, at 6Y, col. 5. Both fathers' requests were
honored, but the principles that justified the decisions are difficult to discern.
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under its parens patriae power in superseding any decisions by the
mother that were abusive or neglectful of her fetus-child!38
B. No Right of Privacy in the Pregnancy
A second rationale the Court might adopt in overruling Roe is that
the woman's right of privacy does not extend to pregnancy. This
rationale gives tremendous latitude to the state in regulating both
abortion and pregnancy. States would be free to exercise sovereign
When a patient is unable to make health care decisions, someone must assume the role of
decisionmaker. Generally, the substitute decisionmaker is limited to choosing the course of
treatment that the patient would have chosen. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-39, 355
A.2d 647, 662-63 (father allowed to request withdrawal of life support system because daughter
would have chosen that), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). For an excellent discussion of the
development of the substitute judgment theory, see Comment, Withholding Treatment From
Seriously Ill and Handicapped Infants: Who Should Make the Decision and How? - An
Analysis of the Government's Response, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 495, 524-31 (1984).
Because the fetus at present is not a person under the Constitution, the father's rights with
respect to the fetus of a comatose mother are not clearly protected. Under present law, therefore,
once the mother in each case became unable to make medical decisions for her fetus, a substitute
decisionmaker, ususally the next of kin, should have been appointed. Even though Mr. Poole
was engaged to the mother, her parents were her next of kin. Similarly, Mr. Piazzi, the mother's
husband in the second case, was her next of kin and should have been the substitute decision-
maker. As substitute decisionmakers, the parents and Mr. Piazzi, respectively, would arguably
have been limited to choosing a course of treatment that their daughter and wife, respectively,
would have chosen had each of them been competent to do so.
If the fetus were a person and the father's rights were constitutionally protected, then the
father's decisionmaking role might have obviated the need to invoke the substituted judgment
doctrine. For example, Mr. Poole, as the fiance of the mother, had an emotional, and perhaps
financial, attachment to the woman and the child she was carrying. Washington Post, July 31,
1986, at A16, col. 2; Gainesville Sun, July 31, 1986, at 4A. Under this view, because he had
established a bond with the fetus-child, he arguably would have had an independent interest in
the decision. His choice, therefore, should have governed over that of the comatose woman's
parents. Only if his choice reflected parental unfitness would the state have needed to look to
a substitute decisionmaker. See supra note 74.
The case involving Mr. Piazzi and Mr. Hadden is more difficult. At common law, Mr. Piazzi,
as the husband, would be presumed to be the father of the child born during the marriage. H.
CLARK, supra note 34, at 156. If the biological father, Mr. Hadden, had declared paternity,
however, and had taken an active role in the woman's pregnancy, then he may have preserved
his rights. Mr. Piazzi, in fact, did not contest Mr. Hadden's paternity. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16,
1986, at 6Y, col. 5.
What probably happened in these two stories is that the state allowed each woman to remain
on the life-support system because of the state's interest in protecting the fetus' potential life.
It was probably less significant who argued for continuing the life-support system than that it
was, in fact, continued. But that kind of reasoning sets a dangerous precedent; it ignores the
fundamental question of who the decisionmaker should be in critical health care situations.
88. See supra notes 73 & 74 and accompanying text.
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discretion in allowing or disallowing abortion. The Court would be
saying, as a matter of constitutional law, that the woman has no right
of privacy in her pregnancy. Regulations designed to promote the
fetus' health would not infringe upon the woman's right of privacy.
For example, the state could allow prenatal tort actions, even against
the woman. Right of privacy concerns would not prevent employers
from prohibiting the pregnant woman from working in hazardous en-
vironments,8 but the state would not be constitutionally compelled to
protect the fetus, even if the state protected persons from similar
types of risks and harms. As long as the fetus is not a person, it could
not demand equal treatment. The state might even have an interest
in compelling abortion to prevent the birth of a defective child.9
A decision holding that the woman has no right of privacy in her
pregnancy also would weaken any arguments that the woman, as
mother, has the constitutional right to make decisions relating to her
pregnancy. Such a broad holding would suggest that the state constitu-
tionally could refuse to recognize the pregnant woman as an independ-
ent decisionmaker, either as an individual asserting her own rights or
as a potential mother asserting her parental rights. This rationale,
therefore, has the potential to be even more formidable and burden-
some on women than the alternative holding that the fetus is a person
under the fourteenth amendment.
C. No Right to Choose Abortion
The Court might take the narrowest route and decide to overrule
Roe by asserting the right of privacy does not extend to the abortion
decision. However, this rationale would leave open the question of
the scope of the woman's right of privacy in other pregnancy-related
decisions. Significantly, this does not mean that the fetus is a person
under the Constitution. Similar to the second rationale, this view
leaves much of the authority to regulate abortion to the state.
Unlike the second alternative, the third basis for overruling Roe
preserves some zone of privacy, limiting the state's ability to regulate
the pregnancy outside of abortion. Unless the Court gave explicit
guidelines about the scope of the woman's right, however, the omis-
sions would spawn tremendous litigation about the state's power to
intervene in the pregnancy to protect the fetus outside of abortion.
89. Whether fetal protection regulations would survive equal protection analysis is a differ-
ent question. See supra notes 25, 46 & 83.
90. See Chemerinsky, mypra note 82, at 117.
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Thus, the situation would not differ from the present one. For example,
prenatal tort actions would appear to be permissible when the injury
is due to the pregnant woman's negligence. The state's subtle form
of regulating to protect the fetus' quality of life would not implicate
the woman's right of privacy. Whether the state, for example, could
go so far as to keep the pregnant woman out of a hazardous work
environment would be an open question, but the woman's right to
autonomy under this view arguably would be broader than under
either of the other rationales.
In addition to maintaining some protection under the right of pri-
vacy doctrine to make decisions affecting her pregnancy, this rationale
also leaves room for the woman to argue for decisionmaking authority
over the fetus as its mother. Her argument would resemble the one
that can be made on behalf of the viable fetus under Roe.91 Absent
unfitness, the mother would be the primary decisionmaker for all
non-abortion pregnancy-related questions. In assuming the role as
mother, of course, the pregnant woman also assumes an interest in
the fetus' quality of life. Unless the Court ruled on the quality-of-life
issue and upheld the state's interest in protecting the fetus from harm,
however, the limits of the mother's right to make decisions on that
basis would be undefined. Would a eugenic abortion be in the fetus'
best interest?
Of the three possible rationales for overruling Roe, the Court most
likely would base a decision to overrule Roe on the third: the right
of privacy does not extend to the abortion decision. Not only is the
third alternative the narrowest, it is the one advocated by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice White, the dissenters in Roe.92 The third
rationale places abortion regulation within the state's sovereignty.9 3
Although the second rationale, that the right of privacy does not
extend to the pregnancy, also places abortion regulation with the
state, that rationale would call into question the validity of many other
right of privacy cases related to pregnancy, such as the use of con-
traceptives and childrearing in general.Y The Court is probably not
91. See supra § II.C.
92. See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
93. Justices Rehnquist and White took the view in their dissents in Roe and Doe that
abortion should be left to the states. Roe, 410 U.S. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe, 410
U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting). They have adhered to this view, and have persuaded at
least Justice O'Connor and former Chief Justice Burger to join them. Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2190 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 2206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. The right of privacy cases that led to the Court's decision in Roe basically started with
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prepared to overrule all cases founded upon an implicit right of privacy.
Finally, the Court has stated that the first rationale, that the fetus
is a person, places the Court in the difficult position of defining life.
The Court has consistently refused to take this position and has argued
that it is unqualified to do so. Moreover, this basis also restricts the
state's freedom to regulate abortion and pregnancy decisions.
Overruling Roe would have little effect on how decisionmaking
should be allocated between the state and the woman when conflicts
about prenatal caretaking develop. Roe simply does not address the
crucial issue of how broad the right of privacy is outside of abortion.
Nor does Roe clarify the pregnant woman's authority as mother of
the fetus in pregnancy and abortion decisionmaking. Most important,
none of the possible rationales for overruling Roe obviates the confu-
sion, or settles the more difficult questions about life, death, and the
appropriate circumstances in which to choose one over the other. Until
the Supreme Court defines those limits, assumptions will continue to
be made, and the various alternatives explored. However, the pro-
blems will not be resolved with any certainty. This raises important
questions. What is to be gained in this area by overruling Roe? Alter-
natively, will anything of significance be lost if the Court retreats
from Roe? Section IV examines these questions.
IV. OVERRULING ROE
A. Possible Reasons for Overruling a Case
Our system of government highly values legal precedent.9 5 Carrying
principles forward to future decisions enhances predictability, reliabil-
ity, and fairness in the overall system.9 In addition, courts are more
efficient when they draw on prior cases and attempt to distinguish
the contraceptive cases, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); and cases involving marriage and the family, see Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right to marry is fundamental right within guarantee of personal privacy);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (right of privacy protects family relationships).
95. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959). Recent debates abound
over the proper approach to constitutional interpretation; that is, whether judges should adhere
to an originalist view or adopt a nonoriginalist view of that document. See infra notes 169-74
and accompanying text. Regardless of a particular court's position in the debate, however, the
court should be principled and consistent in applying the approach it has chosen. Brest, Who
Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 663-64 (1985).
96. See generally Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41 (1979) (explanation
of various forms of judicial usage of stare decisis).
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present cases in establishing the rule that governs a particular situa-
tion. But perhaps one of the most important reasons for following
precedent is that the process gives an aura of objectivity to the judi-
ciary.Y The longer a principle has been adhered to, the more likely
that it has become accepted both socially and politically. Thus, the
Court is subjected to less criticism for adhering to the rule of law.
As important as precedent is in our system, however, the Court
has discretion to disregard precedent and overrule prior decisions."8
The Supreme Court has suggested that its discretion to overrule cases
is broader in constitutional cases. Allowing the Supreme Court the
power to extricate the judiciary from the effects of "bad" decisions is
reasonable.
What constitutes a "bad" decision is the heart of the matter. To
avoid the appearance of acting arbitrarily or in a politically biased
manner, the Court must objectively justify its decision to overrule
precedent. 1'0 Justification for deviating from precedent generally is
based on some change in circumstances. Something happens, between
the time of the original ruling and that of the overruling, that draws
into question the continuing validity of the original case.10 1 For some
97. Bennett, Objectivity and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 483-85 (1984);
Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 983,
999-1000 (1978). But see Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 436 (1985) ("it is
hopeless to suppose that choices [made by judges] will be anything but political, sociological,
and psychological"); Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to
a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 624-25 (1985) (objectivity
depends on the norms or values chosen by the judges to be relied upon).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Court bound by "own sense
of self-restraint" in overruling prior decision). See generally Note, supra note 7, at 374-75
(suggesting "[tihe world of constitutional adjudication would surely profit from a rejection of
stare decisis"); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) ("[wlhether [stare
decisis] shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the
court").
99. Justice Brandeis argued that overruling a constitutional decision through legislative
action was practically impossible. He suggested, therefore, that the Court's responsibility to
follow precedent in such cases was less clear. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
406-07 (1932); see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106
S. Ct. 2169, 2192 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing in support of overruling Roe, "it is
essential that this Court maintain the power to restore authority to its proper possessors by
correcting constitutional decisions that, on reconsideration, are found to be mistaken"). But see
Israel, Gideon v. wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 211, 217 (suggesting
that an "overruling decision represents a source of danger to both professional and popular
acceptance of the Court as the disinterested interpreter of the Constitution"); infra § III.B.3
(discussion of proper role of the Court in our government).
100. Israel, supra note 99, at 219-29.
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reason, the original case is no longer perceived as "right." The most
obvious change that would make an original ruling wrong would be a
constitutional amendment. 102 Short of constitutional amendment,
changes in circumstances that warrant a departure from precedent
become much less obvious, or at least much more debatable.
Generally, changes, excluding amendment, that would explain a
decision to overrule a prior case fall into three categories. 0 3 Most
obviously, if the Court's personnel changes, the previous minority
might gain enough votes or influence to become the majority deci-
sion. 10 Although this smacks of politics and ruins the Court's image
of being above such influences, nothing prevents the President from
nominating for vacancies on the Bench candidates who are likely to
vote a particular way. In fact, it would be unusual for the President
to select a candidate who did not ostensibly conform to the President's
ideologies. 10
101. Id. Judge Cardozo suggested that four principles guide the legal process: the rule of
analogy or method of philosophy; the method of historical evolution; the method of tradition
(customs); and the method of sociology (mores of the day). Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
Process, in C. AUERBACH, L. GARRISON, W. HURST, & S. MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS
367 (1961). For other approaches, see infra note 103.
102. For example, the eleventh amendment, which grants immunity to the states, reversed
the Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419 (1793).
103. Professor Israel has greatly influenced my thinking in this area. He suggests three
reasons that have caused the Court to deviate from past decisions: changed conditions, the
lessons of experience, and the requirement of later precedent. Israel, supra note 99, at 219-26.
Professor Monaghan would add a fourth reason to the list. "Precedent may also be overruled
by reexamination and reinterpretation of the basis for the earlier decision." Monaghan, Taking
Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 3 n.4 (1979). I would include this reason
in Professor Israel's "lessons of experience" category, and I have gone one step further and
merged that category with Professor Israel's last one, "requirements of later precedent." These
are all closely related.
104. See, e.g., The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1872) (two vacancies on
the Court allowed it to gain a majority and overrule Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
603 (1869), decided three years earlier).
105. It would be highly improper for the President to exact a commitment from a judicial
nominee that the candidate would vote a certain way on a given issue. Blaustein & Field,
"Overruling" Opinions in the Suirrerze Court, 57 MICH. L. REv. 152, 182 (1958). For example,
if President Reagan had asked Justice Scalia if he would vote to overrule Roe, that would have
been an improper interference of the executive with the judiciary in violation of the separation
of powers. At the same time, Justice Scalia's record and views on abortion were publicly known
and the President undoubtedly considered the likelihood that Nominee Scalia would vote to
overrule Roe if given the opportunity. However, some commentators argue that the Court must
be a democratic institution, accountable to the people. See also infra, AUTHOR'S ADDENDUM
(discussing Judge Bork's views and the President's preference for conservative ideology). See
genrerally M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). If
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Often changes in the political and social climate also cause the
Court to take a second look at prior holdings. For the most part,
these types of changes evolve over time and involve more than one
Court. The new opinion evidences a shift in society's basic values.
Racial classification, 1 6 particularly the Court's decision to overrule
Plessy v. Ferguson's107 "separate but equal" doctrine in Brown v.
Board of Education,0 8 is a classic example. In striking down the state
law that required racially segregated schools, the Court studied the
"effect of segregation on public education. ' 1  The Court noted the
growing significance of and increasing need for a good education to
prepare children for the future. 10 Psychological studies unavailable at
the time of Plessy demonstrated the harmful effect of segregation on
public school children,' In light of this evidence, the Brown Court
held that the "separate but equal" philosophy of Plessy, followed for
sixty years, could no longer govern society.12
The third reason the Court elects not to follow precedent stems
from a change in perception by various Court members about the
ability of it and the lower courts to adhere to particular principles
embodied within the overruled case.113 Subsequent decisions usually
highlight the freakish nature of the overruled case. The Court's de-
cisions about the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the
"democracy" means following the will of the majority, then the President and elected officials
might have a duty to find out how a judicial nominee will vote on particular issues. See Rees,
Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings: Excluding the Constitution,
17 GA. L. REv. 913 (1983). In our government, however, "democracy" has an additional quality;
it encompasses the value of protecting the minority view. Protecting popular democratic princi-
ples, therefore, is the legislature's responsibility. The judiciary, in contrast, is the safekeeper
of the minority's rights. See, E. CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (Praeger
Pub. Co., N.Y. (forthcoming 1987)).
106. A number of commentators use the opinion in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), to illustrate this basis for overruling precedent. See, e.g., Blaustein & Field, supra note
105, at 157; Israel, supra note 99, at 220-21. For other examples involving the economic changes,
see Blaustein & Field, supra note 105, at 175.
107. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
108. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109. Id. at 492.
110. Id. at 493.
111. Id. at 494-95.
112. Id. at 495. But see Blaustein & Field, supra note 105, at 157 (suggesting that Brown
could have been distinguished from Plessy because it focused upon public education, not public
transportation). The case that overruled Plessy then would have been Gayle v. Browder, 352
U.S. 903 (1956), which held that segregation in public transportation facilities was unconstitu-
tional. See Blaustein & Field, supra note 105, at 158. The authors note, however, that the
Gayle Court did not say it was overruling Plessy, and cited to Brown for its decision. Id.
113. Israel, supra note 99, at 223-26.
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states provide a recent example. In National League of Cities v.
Usery,14 the Court held that states were not bound by the minimum
wage and hour provisions of the Act, because regulations of those
employment conditions were "traditional government functions" pro-
tected by the tenth amendment. 115 For nine years, the Court struggled
with its opinion in National League of Cities, straining to adhere to
its holding that the tenth amendment restricted Congress' power under
the commerce clause to regulate minimum wage and hour provisions
of employment."16 Finally, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,17 a majority of the Court concluded that the deci-
sion in National League of Cities "departed from a proper understand-
ing of congressional power under the Commerce Clause."' 8 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, acknowledged the burden upon
an overruling court to justify its decision, and felt that "[d]ue respect
for the reach of congressional power within the federal system man-
date[d]" that the Court depart from National League of Cities."9
Of the three primary reasons for overruling precedent, a change
in Court personnel is the least valid., It casts a shadow over the
judiciary's independence. 20 Overruling precedent because social condi-
tions change also is controversial. It raises fundamental questions
about the judiciary's role in our government. Is it or is it not an
anti-majoritarian institution? 2' Regardless of the answer, once a prin-
ciple is decided, another question is whether there are compelling
reasons to adhere to it.=
A departure from precedent because the Court believes a prior
decision was wrong is perhaps the least problematic reason for deviat-
ing from precedent. An individual Justice should be entitled to a change
of mind. The ability to reflect upon the law in light of experience is
114. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105
S. Ct. 1005 (1985)).
115. Id. at 852.
116. See generally L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 121-37 (1985).
117. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
118. Id. at 1021.
119. Id.
120. See Israel, supra note 99, at 218, 228-29.
121. See supra note 105; infra § III.B.3.
122. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 97, at 485-86 ("The legitimacy of Roe v. Wade .. .
should be debated in terms of institutional continuity and of its substantive merits and not by
reference to one or another dubious and inevitably incomplete standard of authoritativeness.");
Monaghan, supra note 103, at 8 (author would be "reluctant now to disturb [Roe's] authority,"
although he believes it was incorrectly decided); see also Note, supra note 7, at 359-61 (arguments
for and against overruling Roe).
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a value that should not be undermined; in fact, it should be fostered.
The more successful the individual Justices are in providing objective
reasons for a change of mind, so that only their scholarship is open
to criticism, the less they can be criticized for structuring constitutional
law to reflect their personal beliefs. Public faith in the judiciary will
also be enhanced if the Justices' reasoning is at least made public for
review.m
B. Changed Circumstances Since Roe Do Not Justify Overruling Roe
1. Changes in Court Personnel
Roe was a seven to two opinion written by Justice Blackmun and
joined by former Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Douglas,
Marshall, Powell, and Stewart. Justices White and Rehnquist dis-
sented. For ten years, this balance was maintained on the critical
issue of whether abortion should be allowed, although the Justices
disagreed on the limits of state power to regulate it. 1
In 1983, however, the vote shifted to six to three in City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 12 At issue in Akron was
the validity of a state law requiring all second-trimester abortions be
performed in a hospital.1 26 In striking down the statute, the Court
recognized that, because of advances in medical technology, certain
abortions during the early weeks of the second trimester could be
performed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a hospital."2 Thus,
the statute failed to further the state's interest in protecting maternal
health during the early weeks of the second trimester.a Moreover,
because hospital abortions cost nearly twice as much as those per-
formed in outpatient clinics, 129 the statute imposed an undue burden
upon a woman's constitutional right of privacy. 013
123. When the Court fails to give any reasons for its decision to overrule precedent, Pro-
fessors Blaustein and Field characterize the decision as "unwarranted." Blaustein & Field, supra
note 105, at 177.
124. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). All but Justice White agreed that the
state could require parental consent for the immature minor seeking an abortion if the minor
could not otherwise demonstrate that it would be in her best interest to proceed without such
consent. Justice White believed that parental consent could be required for all minors. Id. at
656 (White, J., dissenting).
125. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
126. Akron, 462 U.S. at 422 n.3.
127. Id. at 436.
128. Id. at 437.
129. Id. at 434-35 ("in-hospital abortion costs $850-$900, whereas a dilatation-and-evacuation
(D&E) abortion performed in a clinic costs $350-$400") (footnote omitted).
130. Id. at 438-39.
[V~ol. 39
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Justice O'Connor, who replaced Justice Stewart on the Bench,
provided the third dissenting vote in Akron. Moreover, Justice O'Con-
nor impugned the entire Roe trimester framework in her dissenting
opinion.131 She suggested that as medical technology continues to im-
prove, the state's interest in regulating to protect maternal health
will decrease as the pregnancy develops. Justice O'Connor also as-
serted that medical technology will move viability up to an earlier
stage. She concluded, therefore, that Roe is on a collision course with
itself.13 2 The implication of her dissent in Akron is that she would vote
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White to overrule Roe.
During the 1986 term, the vote shifted again and is now at five
to four to uphold Roe. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstet-
ricians & Gynecologists,13 3 the Court struck down various abortion
regulations. These regulations included informed consent provisions,
reporting provisions, and provisions that the physician take all reason-
able steps to keep a possibly viable fetus alive during an abortion
procedure.14 The decision proved too much for the former Chief Jus-
tice, who believed that the regulations legitimately served the state's
interests as articulated in Roe. 3 Because the majority struck down
provisions he felt were constitutional, he concluded that it was time
to reconsider Roe.136
If Roe were overruled, it would probably be by a five to four vote.
Former Chief Justice Burger's retirement is unlikely to affect the vote
because Justice Scalia probably will align with the Thornburgh dissen-
ters as did Chief Justice Burger, leaving it at five to four to uphold
Roe. Thus, the swing vote would have to come from one of the Justices
who originally voted in favor of Roe.
Even if the newly constituted Court overruled Roe, the members
should not be criticized for politicizing the vote. Votes along political
lines have been less than predictable with respect to the changes in
personnel since Roe. When Roe was decided, President Nixon had
just appointed Chief Justice Burger to replace Chief Justice Warren.
The President also had appointed Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
Powell to the Bench. At the time, one would have predicted that all
131. Id. at 453-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
133. 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
134. Id. at 2181-84.
135. Id. at 2190 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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of Nixon's appointees would have voted to uphold the anti-abortion
statute in Roe. In fact, Justice Rehnquist was the only one who did.
Similarly, Justice Douglas voted for Roe, and one would have expected
his replacement, Justice Stevens, appointed by President Ford, to
have nullified his vote. Instead, Justice Stevens has vigorously sup-
ported Roe.1" 7 Justice O'Connor, appointed by President Reagan, is
the only member of the Court who voted as one might have predicted.
Her vote successfully nullified Justice Stewart's. The change in person-
nel, therefore, would result in a six to three split. The present five
to four split comes from former Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
Thornburgh and his suggestion that perhaps Roe should be recon-
sidered. 1" Justice Scalia will substitute his vote for the former Chief
Justice's, unless he fails to live up to predictions.
2. Changes in Social Conditions
Have changes in society occurred since Roe to justify a swing
voter's reversal of the opinion on this basis? Anti-abortionists certainly
have nationalized their opinion. 139 The pervasiveness of their message
reflects their tremendous lobbying power, but whether most Amer-
icans disfavor abortion is unclear. 140 One recent study recorded that
only sixteen percent of the polled population wanted all abortions
outlawed, while forty percent wanted abortion to be legal in cases of
incest, rape, or when the mother's life was jeopardized. 4 1 In the same
poll, however, sixty-six percent of the sample agreed with the state-
ment that "abortion is sometimes the best thing in a bad situation.1''
Only forty-one percent wanted to amend the Constitution to reflect
their beliefs.143
Marbury v. Madison"4 authorized Supreme Court review of the
law regardless of popular sentiment."4 After all, if the Court were
137. Justice Stevens spoke adamantly in Thornburgh about adhering to stare decisis and
sharply criticized Justice White's dissent for advocating that Roe should be overruled. 106 S.
Ct. 2169, 2185-90 (Stevens, J., concurring).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36 (discussion of Thornburgh).
139. See supra notes 3-4.
140. See Abortion and Ambivalence: One Issue that Seems to Defy a Yes or No, N.Y.




144. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
145. This issue raises larger questions about the role of the Court in a democracy. See
infra § III.B.3.
[VCol. 39
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persuaded to make decisions on particular issues according to public
opinion polls, Brown and other cases supporting civil rights for racial
minorities probably would not exist.146 Although Brown deviated from
prior decisions, the Court justified its position in the opinion. 147 If
people want to guarantee that the law reflects popular sentiment,
then perhaps the legislature should be the final arbiter of what the
law is. 14 But our system gives the Supreme Court the role of final
legal arbiter. Just as the Court fulfilled that role in Brown by protect-
ing blacks against racial prejudice, so should it fulfill that role by
protecting a woman's right to choose, regardless of how most Amer-
icans feel about abortion.
One societal change that may influence some Justices' decisions
about the continuing validity of Roe is the progress being made in
neonatology.14 9 Since Roe, medical advancements enable some prema-
146. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (upheld right of interracial couple to
marry, though racism was quite prevalent at the time). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.
Ct. 2841 (1986). In Hardwick, the Court upheld an anti-sodomy statute as applied to homosexuals.
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Hardwick highlights the parallels between that case
and Loving. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2854 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Just as desegregation
was unpopular and blacks were a scorned group at the time of Loving, homosexuality is very
unpopular today, and gay people generally are ostracized from the mainstream.
Brown, although a unanimous decision, was arguably decided incorrectly, because the Court
deviated too far in its interpretation of the Constitution according to its textual language and
the framers' intent. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 105, at 66-69 (suggesting that if one
accepts the theory that the Constitution should be interpreted according to what the framers'
original understanding was, then "Brown must be deemed illegitimate"); see also Wechsler,
supra note 95, at 32-35 (state enforced segregation is not an issue of discrimination but one of
freedom to associate). Supporters of this position conclude that because the framers did not
intend to eliminate segregation, Brown violates the proper way of interpreting the Constitution.
If the Court had voted to uphold the "separate but equal" law, that would have been the
"correct" way to interpret the Constitution. A vote the other way in Brown would also have
supported popular sentiment about race relations. But see Simon, supra note 97, at 629 ("an
outcome opposite to that reached by the [Brown) Court would have been impossible to justify
as a matter of political morality and, therefore, law") (footnote omitted).
The majority in Hardwick, in fact, reached its conclusion to uphold the anti-sodomy statute
by choosing to interpret the Constitution according to what the framers intended. Hardwick,
106 S. Ct. at 2844-46. Ironically, the Hardwick Court, similar to the Brown Court, can also be
criticized for interpreting the Constitution inappropriately. The critics of Hardwick would argue
that the Court cannot possibly know what the framers intended, and that the Constitution must
evolve to reflect modern conceptions of protected constitutional rights. The Court's decision to
uphold the anti-sodomy statute may reflect popular sentiment about homosexuality in this coun-
try, but whether it reflects popular sentiment about the right of privacy is unclear. This is the
debate that presently has Roe at its center. See infra § III.B.3.
147. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
148. Simon, supra note 97, at 605.
149. Justice O'Connor, in particular, has questioned the validity of Roe's trimester
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 97 1987
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
ture babies to live beyond previous expectations. 150 As the point of
viability occurs at earlier stages of gestation, some have suggested
that Roe's trimester scheme for regulating abortion loses its validity. 1,
Overruling Roe because of changes in medical technology would
be premature and speculative. The point of viability continues to fall
primarily at the beginning of the last trimester. 152 Viability does not
framework in light of medical advancements. See supra notes 5, 131-132. Justices Rehnquist
and White joined her on this issue in Akron. 462 U.S. at 452-59 (White and Rehnquist, J.J.,
dissenting).
For recent literature on the progress being made in infant health care, see R. BOLOGNESE,
R. SCHWARTZ, & J. SCHNEIDER, PERINATAL MEDICINE: MANAGEMENT OF THE HIGH RIsK
FETUS AND NEONATE (2d ed. 1982); Battaglia, Neonatal Surgery: Changing Patterns 1972-1980,
17 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 666 (1982); Dibbins, Curci, McCrann, Prenatal Diagnosis of Con-
genital Anomalies Requiring Surgical Correction: Implications for the Future, 149 AM. J.
SURGERY 528 (1985); see also Rhoden, supra note 13, at 639 (medical technology should not
rule abortion law because that would conflict with the spirit of Roe, which implied that viability
meant that a fetus was substantially developed).
150. See Goldenberg, Survival of Infants with Low Birth Weight and Early Gestational
Age, 1979 to 1981, AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, July 1, 1984, at 508; Progress in
Perinatal Medicine III, 3rd International Berlin Meeting of Perinatal Medicine, 12 J. PERINATAL
MEDICINE 1 (1984); Stahlman, Newborn Intensive Care: Success or Failure, 105 J. PEDIATRICS
162 (1984).
151. See supra note 5; see also Ely, supra note 50, at 923-26 (noting that the point of
viability will change With medical developments and criticizing the court for selecting viability
as the point at which the state interest in protecting the fetus becomes compelling); Epstein,
supra note 50, at 180-83 (discussing the court's attempt to balance the interests of the woman,
the fetus, and the state); Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 168-71 (1985) (suggesting that the Court abdi-
cated its responsibility in Roe by making viability the critical point and deferring to the physician
to advise how and when technological advancements will affect fetal development). But see
Rhoden, supra note 13 (suggesting that although viability concept may change wvith technology,
the trimester scheme of Roe illustrates the understanding that the fetus becomes more like a
person as it matures).
152. At the time of Roe, medical knowledge indicated that viability occurred at about 28
weeks of gestation. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. The Roe Court also acknowledged that viability could
occur as early as 24 weeks, the dividing line between the second and third trimesters. Id.
Even today, no clear consensus exists among medical professionals as to when viability
occurs, or whether it should be measured by gestational age or weight. Lenow, supra note 61,
at 11. One study defined viability at 26 weeks gestation. Koops, Morgan, & Battaglia, Neonatal
Mortality Risk in Relation to Birth Weight and Gestational Age: Update, 101 J. PEDIATRICS
969, 975 (1982). The authors of another study, using birth weight as the indicator, noted that
in the early 1970s neonatal survival for infants weighing less than 1,000 grams was 10%. Hoskins,
Elliot, Shennan, Skidmore, & Keith, Outcome of Very Low-Birth Weight Infants Born at a
Perinatal Center, 145 AM. J. OBSTETRICS-GYNECOLOGY 135, 138 (1985). Their study indicated
that by 1985 survival increased to 79% for infants between 750 and 1,000 grams. Id. Survival
rates for infants weighing between 599 and 750 grams, however, was only 39%. Id.
[Vol. 39
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routinely occur before that stage of development. 1' Moreover, medical
technology could be years away from simultaneous occurrence of con-
ception and viability.I5 Until medical technology advances to that stage
of development, questions about a woman's right not to conceive and
bear a child will continue to exist, and the viability versus non-viability
distinction in Roe will remain valid.
Viability has not progressed to a point significantly earlier in the
pregnancy, but this fact does not obviate the dilemma; it merely post-
pones the search for a solution. Even if viability occurs at conception,
fundamental questions about the state's proper role in a woman's
Robert Weir defines infants born between 24 and 30 weeks gestational age with birth weights
between 500 and 1,500 grams as extremely premature neonates. R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NON-
TREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS 39 (1984). His statistics of these infants in neonatal
intensive care units indicate that their chance of survival at 26 weeks is approximately 25%,
while survival at 29 weeks is 90%. Id.
In short, many of the available statistics about premature infant survival rates fall within
the expectations of Roe. For example, two noted authorities in neonatal medicine reported in
19&5 that a 24 week old fetus (weighing 650 grams) will usually die soon after birth; a 28 week
old fetus (weighing 1,100 grams) may survive with expert care; and a 32 week old fetus (weighing
1,800 grams) should survive with proper care. J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT,
supra note 18, at 143.
153. A few infants born before the 24th gestational week have survived in recent years.
Justice O'Connor cited one example of an infant born at 22 weeks of gestation who survived.
Akron, 462 U.S. at 457 n.5 (citing Washington Post, Mar. 31, 1983, at A2, col. 2). The fourth
smallest infant reported to have survived may be a 440 grain infant born at 25 weeks gestational
age. This infant was cared for in a neonatal intensive care unit and the doctors report this case
to be the smallest infant whose progress was followed and studied scientifically. Pleasure, Dhand,
& Kaur, What is the Lower Limit of Viability?, 138 Am. J. DISEASES OF CHILDREN 783 (1984).
154. The viability issue has focused upon the fetus' ability to live outside of the womb,
which is how the Roe Court defined the term. It is unclear, however, whether the Court meant
to limit its understanding of viability to the particular woman's womb, or if the fetus was only
viable when it could survive outside of any womb. The possibility for implanting a fertilized
egg into another woman's womb means that it can survive outside of the original mother's
womb. It cannot survive outside of any womb, however, for more than 3-4 days. Would this
mean then, that viability has become possible at conception? My colleague, Jannis Goodnow,
raised this question in one of our discussions. For an excellent analysis of current reproductive
technology from in vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood to the future possibility of
ectogenesis, see P. SINGER & D. WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE AND ETHICS
OF CONCEPTION (1985). A comprehensive treatment of established law and emerging theories
in all areas of human procreation is found in HANDLING PREGNANCY AND BIRTH CASES (W.
Winborne ed. 1983). See also Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproductive
Technologies, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1984, at 50 (discussing artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization,
and surrogate motherhood); Robertson, supra note 36 (discussing scope of artificial conception
and the constitutional protection); Waddlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family
Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465 (1983) (analyzing existing law dealing with artificial conception and
areas of potential modification).
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childbearing decision still need to be examined. Presumably, some
abortions would always be permissible. 1' For example, many statutes
except from criminal liability abortions that are performed because
the fetus was conceived as a result of incest or rape. 1 6 Other statutes
allow the woman to abort a fetus that would be born with severe
defects. 157 Whether these statutes would remain valid if Roe were
rejected would depend on the Court's rationale in the overruling
case." 'Recall that the ramifications of a holding that the fetus is a
person differ from those of a holding that restricts the right of privacy.
Furthermore, the question of whether quality of life can be a factor
in regulating the pregnancy would still be unanswered. Thus, overrul-
ing Roe because the Court injudiciously tied its rationale to medical
science overlooks the more serious shortcomings of Roe. These
shortcomings can be resolved, however, only by clarifying what Roe
omitted, not by overruling the decision.
Thus far, neither a change in personnel nor a change in social
conditions will justify a decision to overrule Roe. The final question
is whether certain members of the Court feel that they can no longer
adhere to Roe and continue to be consistent with some of the principles
they have announced since that decision. Has one of the Justices in
the Roe majority deviated from his stand on the right of privacy
doctrine so that Roe is no longer consistent with it? Alternatively,
has one Justice of the Roe majority changed his mind about the proper
role of the federal judiciary in defining the right of privacy?
3. Changes in Ability to Adhere to Other Principles
Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist find Roe problematic
because they believe that the right to choose abortion cannot be found
or implied in the Constitution. Adhering to the standard adopted by
the Court in a case decided thirty-six years before Roe,5 9 and applied
155. Even the Texas statute in Roe excepted from criminal prosecution abortions that were
necessary to save the mother's life. Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-18 n.1. However, even without Roe
a woman could probably not be forced to sacrifice her life for that of the fetus. See generally
Regan, supra note 23.
156. See, e.g., 410 U.S. at 183. The Doe Court noted that the American Law Institute's
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) had similar exceptions. Id. at 182,
205-06. For statutes with similar provisions, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2554 (1977); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-6-101 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790 (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-3407(2) (1981).
157. See supra note 41.
158. See supra § II.
159. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
[Vol. 39
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 100 1987
PRENATAL CARETAKING
in Roe, 16 Justice White wrote in his Thornburgh dissent that the right
of privacy protects only those rights that are either "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty"'16 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition."' He and Chief Justice Rehnquist believe that abortion
does not fit this standard.163
The Court's decision in Bowers v. HardwickT3 raises some doubt
about the continuing validity of Roe. In Hardwick, the Court held by
a five to four vote that the right of privacy does not include the right
to engage in homosexual sodomy.'6 Justice White, writing for the
Hardwick majority, held that because laws proscribing homosexual
sodomy have deep historical origins,'6 it is "facetious" to suggest that
the right to engage in homosexual sodomy is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history or tradition," or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."'167 Former Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, and Powell joined his opinion.
What do Hardwick and homosexuality have to do with Roe and
abortion? The opinion in Hardwick bears on the stability and validity
of Roe in a number of ways. The suggestion that implied rights are only
those that have been around a long time opens up the unending and
unendable debate about the proper way for the Supreme Court to
interpret the Constitution. 168 Should the Supreme Court interpret the
Constitution according to its literal language, gaining insight into the
gray areas only by looking at the original intent of the framers? This
160. 410 U.S. at 152.
161. 106 S. Ct. at 2194 (White, J., dissenting).
162. Id. The language "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" comes from
Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(footnote omitted), in which the court held invalid a zoning law that narrowed the definition of
family to exclude relatives outside the nuclear family.
163. Former Chief Justice Burger seemed to agree with them by suggesting in Thornburgh
that it was time to reconsider the validity of Roe. Id. at 2190 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
164. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
165. Id. The Court had implicitly decided this question in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
425 U.S. 901 (1976), in which the Court affirmed without opinion a lower court's decision to
uphold its anti-sodomy statute. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart voted to hear oral
arguments in that case. The Hardwick Court left open the question of the validity of an anti-
sodomy statute as applied to heterosexual couples. 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
166. Id. at 2844.
167. Id. at 2846.
168. Professor Perry suggests that the debate about the meaning of the Constitution is
"interminable," because "any argument for or against a particular conception of judicial role -
any such conception . . . is, in the nature of things, contingent, speculative, and provisional,
and therefore revisable." Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of
Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 588 (1985) (footnote omitted).
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position is known as the "originalist" view. 169 The majority in Hardwick
comes close to answering yes to this question.17o In contrast, is the
Supreme Court free to read into the Constitution to protect values
that are not explicit in the Constitution, but that necessarily derive
from it according to modern mores? This position is known as the
"non-originalist" view. 17  The majority in Roe adheres to the non-
originalist view. 7 2
169. Although "originalists" differ among themselves about what they mean by the term,
generally they suggest that judges are limited in their discretion to interpret the Constitution
by the textual language of the document, and by the original intent of the framers. Prior to
the use of the term "originalism," coined by Professor Brest, see Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980), the term "interpretivism," coined
by Professor Grey, described the general concept. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitu-
tion?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980);
M. PERRY, supra note 105, at 101 (Perry suggests, however, that courts should depart from
an originalist approach in "individual rights" cases for the sake of promoting moral growth);
Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
695; Michaels, Response to Perry and Simon, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 673 (1985); Monaghan, Our
Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitu.
tion, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1976); Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful
Contributions of Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1983).
170. Justice White said in Hardwick, 'The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots
in the language or design of the Constitution." Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846. But see supra
note 146 (comparison of Brown Court's view of its role in determining validity of racial segregation
laws).
171. Advocates of the "non-originalist" or "non-interpretivist" camp suggest that judges
are not, and cannot be, confined to the literal textual language, and that resort to the original
intent of the framers is impossible. They believe that it is legitimate, even necessary, to interpret
the Constitution according to modern principles and values. See supra note 146 and accompanying
text (comparison of the different views of Court's role in Brown and Hardwick). See generally
Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What it Always Meant?, 77 COLum. L. REV.
1029 (1977); Simon, supra note 97; Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution:
Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482 (1985); Tushnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV.
781, 783 (1983).
172. In the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "Great concepts like ... liberty'... were
purposely left to gather meaning from experience. For they related to the whole domain of
social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only
a stagnant society remains unchanged." Roe, 410 U.S. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)). For discussions of the view that the Constitution embodies certain implied rights,
in particular the right of privacy, see Craven, Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone, 1976
DUKE L.J. 699; Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of
Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293 (1986); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE
L.J. 624 (1980). But see, Ely, supra note 50, at 943 (suggesting that Roe lacks even colorable
support for the text or history of the Constitution); Epstein, supra note 50, at 185 (criticizing
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It is conceptually difficult to distinguish why the right to choose
abortion is included in the right of privacy and the right to engage in
consenting homosexual sodomy is not. 17 The line of cases leading to
Roe'7 - support extending the right of privacy to protect from state
interference the sexual activity of consenting adults. 175 As Justice
Blackmun said in his Hardwick dissent, "This case is no more about
'a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,' . . this case
is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone."'176 That right is
deeply rooted in this Country's tradition. 17
Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist probably would concede
that there is no principled basis to justify including the right to choose
abortion within the right of privacy, and excluding the right to engage
in homosexual sodomy from constitutional protection. 1s All along, they
"entire method of constitutional interpretation that allows the Supreme Court in the name of
Due Process both to 'define' and to 'balance' interests on the major social and political issues
of our time"); Perry, supra note 168, at 601 ("We know enough about the common original
understanding of section one of the fourteenth amendment to conclude that Roe v. Wade cannot
plausibly be explained in originalist terms." (footnote omitted)).
173. The Court, at least implicitly, acknowledged its responsibility to attempt to distinguish
Hardiwick from prior right of privacy cases, but limited its effort to the conclusion that Hardwick
does not resemble the prior cases. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844. Writing for the majority,
Justice White continued, "Moreover, any claim that [previous right of privacy] cases nevertheless
stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is
constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable." Id. If one wonders what
the distinction is between homosexuality and other right of privacy issues to justify denying
constitutional protection to consenting homosexual adults, Justice White's explanation is unil-
luminating. See generally Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 305 (1987) (ninth amendment provides textual support for right of privacy
to engage in consenting adult homosexual sodomy).
174. See generally Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its
Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973).
175. See Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the Constitution?,
58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 488-90 (1983); Massey, supra note 173, at 331-37; see also Karst,
supra note 172, at 664-65 ("freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life'
... goes beyond the relationships of marriage and family to other forms of intimate association"
(quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring)). But see Gray, Eros, Civilization and
the Burger Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, at 83 (suggesting that since its
decision in Griswold, the Court has not indicated that it would support a right to sexual freedom).
176. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177. Id.
178. In Hardwick, Justice white "accepted" the validity of Roe, and quickly attempted to
distinguish homosexuality from abortion. 106 S. Ct. at 2844. His arguments supporting a distinc-
tion, however, were tautological and unpersuasive. See supra note 173. A reading of Justice
White's entire opinion in Hardwick implies that he only accepted the decisions in Roe and other
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have been arguing that Roe cannot be justified because the right to
choose abortion is not implicit in the Constitution. Hardwick, then,
presents the Court's dilemma most poignantly: have Justice White
and Chief Justice Rehnquist mustered enough support to retreat from
Roe?
Newly appointed Justice Scalia probably would agree that the right
of privacy does not extend to abortion. Justice O'Connor would contrib-
ute the fourth vote to retreat from Roe. However, her reasons for
departing from Roe may not be based upon the belief that the right
of privacy does not include the right to choose abortion under any
circumstances. Her opinions in Akron and Thornburgh reflect an am-
bivalence between aligning with Justice White and Chief Justice
Rehnquist on the basic right of privacy question raised in Roe, and
accepting the right of privacy holding in Roe, but rejecting Roe's
trimester framework for reviewing the validity of state abortion reg-
ulations. 179 Although her vote in Hardwick indicated she believes the
right of privacy is limited, she may again choose to avoid the issue
in that future abortion case when Roe is revisited. She has laid an
adequate foundation for overruling Roe on the rationale that medical
technology has rendered Roe obsolete.ls ° Some viewers, therefore, see
the consistency between a vote by Justice O'Connor to overrule Roe
and her vote in Hardwick.
Justice Powell's position on the scope of the right of privacy is
unclear after Hardwick. His opinions and votes in the abortion and
other right of privacy cases indicate that he aligns more with a non-
originalist view of the Constitution in this area. As recently as his
decision in Akron, Justice Powell reaffirmed his position that "the full
scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees
elsewhere provided in the Constitution.181
right of privacy cases for expediency, and that he really believes that neither abortion nor
homosexuality is constitutionally protected under the right of privacy.
179. For example, in Akron Justice O'Connor wrote the dissenting opinion, which Justice
White and then Justice Rehnquist joined. She intimated that Roe's holding that the right of
privacy protects the right to have an abortion was invalid, but she was willing to accept Roe's
holding and describe how the state regulations at issue were nonetheless valid under Roe.
Akron, 462 U.S. at 452-53, 459 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Thornburgh, Justice O'Connor
wrote a separate dissent from Justice White and specifically agreed with only part of his dissent,
which was joined by Justice Rehnquist. Justice O'Connor separated her opinion from that part
of Justice White's dissent that addressed whether the right of privacy could be found in the
Constitution. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
180. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
181. Akron, 462 U.S. at 427 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
[Vol. 39
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 104 1987
PRENATAL CARETAKING
Addressing fears of Lochnerism in one right of privacy case, Justice
Powell stated that we should be concerned "lest the only limits to
... judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen
at the time to be Members of this Court. That history counsels caution
and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment."'1 2 Since Roe,
Justice Powell has not hinted at a retreat from his position that the
right of privacy is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to
have an abortionlsa Still, his opinions in right of privacy cases reflect
some judicial restraint. For example, Justice Powell has strongly ad-
vocated deference to state legislatures in cases involving marriage.'8
He also has suggested that not all regulations affecting privacy rights
require justification under a strict compelling state interest test.',, He
does suggest in those cases, however, that laws restricting the right
dissenting from dismissal of appeal)).
182. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion) (footnote
omitted).
183. In every abortion case in which he has participated, Justice Powell has voted to protect
a woman's right to choose abortion. However, he has voted against upholding a woman's right
to receive government funding to have an abortion. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In each of those decisions,
he stressed the difference between the right to have an abortion and the right to have an
abortion funded by the government. This distinction may not withstand logical analysis. See
generally Appelton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abor-
tion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1981); Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 377; Law, supra note 48, at 1016-28;
Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American
Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191 (1978); Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in
the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. Ruv. 1113
(1980); Tribe, Commentary: The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330 (1985). Justice Powell departs
from his supporters on the funding issue when it comes down to the abortion itself. His vote
with respect to the minor woman has also been more constrained. Justice Powell requires
parental consent for any immature minor who cannot demonstrate to a judge that an abortion
without parental involvement would be in her best interest. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
184. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhal, 434 U.S. 374, 398-99 (1978) (starting point for reviewing
validity of state law that required judicial consent before resident who had court order to support
minor issue not in resident's custody could marry is recognition that domestic relations issues
have traditionally been left to the state).
185. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). In Carey, the Court
reviewed the validity of state regulations governing the distribution and advertisement of con-
traceptives. Justice Powell voted to strike down the restrictive regulations, except as they
applied to minors. In doing so, however, he stated that the Court unnecessarily extended the
reach of Griswold and Roe by requiring that the state regulations in question serve a "compelling
state interest." Id. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring). He found that this heightened standard of
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of privacy are subject to constitutional limitations and that some level
of judicial review is appropriate.'6
Without judging the correctness of Justice Powell's view on con-
stitutional interpretation, because there is no right answer,8 7 it is
unclear why in Hardwick he departed from his previous position. The
majority opinion, which he joined, adamantly espouses an originalist
view of the right of privacy doctrine. Although Justice Powell wrote
a concurring opinion, he did not attempt to explain how he interprets
the Constitution so that abortion and other matters relating to sexual
privacy and autonomy are protected by the right of privacy, and
homosexual sodomy between consenting adults is unprotected. Rather,
his concurrence seems to be an attempt to minimize the impact of his
vote by suggesting that the eighth amendment prohibits states from
excessively punishing adults who engage in homosexual sodomy.'8
One must wonder: If Justice Powell can adequately explain the distinc-
tion he is making, why did he not offer such an explanation in
Hardwick? His vote in Hardwick raises the question whether he is
beginning to believe that the right of privacy cases have led the Court
too far away from its proper function. If so, would Justice Powell vote
to overrule Roe?
If Justice Powell chooses to retreat from Roe, one would expect
him to justify his departure from stare decisis. This task would not
judicial review is not required whenever "sexual freedom" is implicated. Id. His opinion in
Carey, however, is consistent with the view that some level of judicial review is appropriate
to protect from unreasonable state interference the individual right of privacy to have access
to contraceptives; see also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 397-99 (1978) (not all state regulations governing
marital relationship are subject to compelling state interest test) (Powell, J., concurring) (dicta).
186. See, e.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 399-400 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The Due Process
Clause requires a showing of justification 'when the government intrudes on choices concerning
family living arrangements' in a manner which is contrary to deeply rooted traditions." (quoting
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion)); Carey, 431 U.S.
at 705 (regulation of distribution of contraceptives, while not subject to strict scrutiny, "is [not]
free from judicial review").
187. Professor Perry suggests that the disagreement will always remain, and that the most
that we can hope for is to understand "where" and "why" we disagree. Perry, supra note 168,
at 589; see also Brest, supra note 95, at 662 (supporting the view that decisionmakers are
influenced by personal background and concerns, and indicating that this has always been a
problem in constitutional law); Simon, supra note 97, at 629-30 (suggesting through examples
that objective interpretation of the Constitution is not always possible). But see Bennett, supra
note 97 (distinguishing the question of the role of stare decisis from the question involving
constitutional interpretation); Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277, 286 (1985) (suggesting moral questions have right answers).
188. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2847-48 (Powell, J., concurring).
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be easy. His majority opinion in Akron begins with a reminder of the
importance of stare decisis and announces that Roe should be upheld
on such principles. 10 Is it possible that Hardwick marks the absurdity
of the right of privacy doctrine in Justice Powell's mind, causing him
to question the validity of Roe? Notwithstanding his commitment to
abortion and related right of privacy issues, as well as his belief in
adhering to precedent, would he vote to overrule Roe to be consistent
with his decision in Hardwick?
Consistency need not be Justice Powell's goal. But if it is, absent
an adequate justification for distinguishing between Roe and
Hardwick, the history of Justice Powell's view of the Constitution in
the area of privacy rights shows that the inconsistency stems from
Hardwick, not the other cases. Rather than retreat from those deci-
sions, Justice Powell would appear more objective and free from per-
sonal bias on abortion and homosexual rights if he changed his vote
in the next Hardwick-type case. Of course, he is free to remain incon-
sistent, preserving his credibility in the abortion line of cases, and
leaving the appearance that he allowed his personal bias against
homosexual rights to influence his vote in Hardwick.
To summarize, it appears that the votes to overrule Roe are not
present. The pressure on Justice Powell, if he cares to appear consis-
tent, objective, and free from personal prejudice, may be too great
for him to retreat from Roe and its progeny. It would be far easier
for him to remove himself from the position as the potential swing
vote by acknowledging his inconsistency and expressing a willingness
to live with it, or by retreating from his position in Hardwick. Short
of these measures, a vote by Justice Powell to overrule Roe would
severely undermine the principles of stare decisis and the perception
that the Supreme Court is above personal bias. Principles of legal
precedent and judicial objectivity weigh in favor of adhering to Roe.
189. Akron, 462 U.S. at 420 n.1. The Akron Court noted that "[t]he doctrine of stare
decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that
demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law." Id. (footnote omitted). The Court
noted at least three important reasons for adhering to the doctrine of stare decisis in abortion
cases. First, Roe was argued and reargued before the Court. Id. at 420. Second, seven Justices,
including the Chief Justice, joined the Roe opinion. Id. Finally, the principles of Roe have been
applied in a litany of cases, all of which have upheld a woman's right of privacy to choose
abortion over childbirth. Id. The Court then cited to H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977);
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976);
Connecticut v. menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
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V. CONCLUSION
Abortion is unpleasant; even to talk about abortion is unpleasant.
Abortion raises questions of morality, questions about life and death,
and questions that make people uncomfortable because there are no
right answers. This article has attempted to demonstrate that with
or without Roe, the difficult questions concerning the state's role in
prenatal caretaking will continue unanswered. Unless the Supreme
Court addresses the assumptions underlying the abortion controversy,
overruling Roe will not resolve the problem of allocating decisionmak-
ing responsibility between the woman and the state during the
woman's pregnancy. Regardless of whether the fetus is a person,
whether the woman's right of privacy extends to abortion, or whether
the states should be making these decisions, fundamental constitutional
questions about life and death, parental authority over the fetus, and
the scope of the woman's right of privacy outside of abortion have
not been answered by the Supreme Court. Roe provides a building
block for answering these questions. If the Supreme Court overruled
Roe the situation would become more chaotic and uncertain. Most
important, a decision to overrule Roe cannot be justified. Nothing has
happened since Roe to warrant a reversal. If the Supreme Court
departed from Roe now, its institutional credibility would be severely
undermined.
AUTHOR'S ADDENDUM
Justice Powell announced his retirement from the Court on June
26, 1987, as this article was being printed. 11 President Reagan nomi-
nated Robert H. Bork, a judge on the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, to assume Justice Powell's position. 19 In response to the
public outcry over Judge Bork's nomination, Senator Joseph Biden,
Chair of the Judiciary Committee, promised President Reagan a battle
in opposition to Judge Bork's confirmation.92 Such a battle highlights
many of the principles focused upon in section IV of this article.
Because Justice Powell provided the fifth and decisive vote in sev-
eral important civil rights cases,193 many perceive his successor as the
190. See Taylor, Powell Leaves High Court; Took Key Role on Abortion and on Aff7rmative
Action, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1987, 1, at § 1, col. 6.
191. See Boyd, Bork Picked for High Court; Reagan Cites His 'Restraint'; Confirmation
Fight Looms, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
192. See Greenhouse, Senators' Remarks Portend a Bitter Debate Over Bork, N.Y. Times,
July 2, 1987, § 1, at 8, col. 1.
193. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 181-89 for a discussion of Justice Powell's
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holder of the trump card in future civil rights cases. Consequently,
the nominee's views about how to interpret the Constitution, and the
Court's role in our government, are of utmost importance in selecting
a replacement for Justice Powell.
Judge Bork is an originalist; he is committed to interpreting the
Constitution according to the original intent of the framers.'9 Consis-
tent with an originalist view, he believes that the Roe decision is
unconstitutional. 195 Although Judge Bork commented that President
Reagan did not ask him before the nomination how he would vote on
issues such as abortion,19 the President surprised no one by nominating
to the Bench a conservative like Judge Bork. If Judge Bork is con-
firmed, many people believe the Court probably will overrule Roe.197
If Judge Bork is not confirmed, President Reagan's second nominee
probably will also adhere to a conservative ideology, causing continued
speculation as to whether Roe will be overruled.
Thus, the crucial question in the battle for Justice Powell's seat
on the Bench is whether the Senate should block confirmation of a
nominee on ideological grounds. 19 If the answer is "no," then the
answer must also be "no" to the question whether it is proper for the
President to nominate a candidate on ideological grounds. But what
criteria, other than the obvious ones of qualifications, may the Pres-
ident realistically consider in trying to distinguish among many qual-
pivotal position in Hardwick. Cf. Taylor, Powell's Pivotal Votes Marked '87 Court Term, N.Y.
Times, June 28, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (list of split decisions in the Court's 1987 Term in which
Justice Powell provided swing vote).
194. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 8 (1971) ("Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred,
.. . [t]he judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair implications, and
not construct new rights."); Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Con-
tradictions of Nornative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1089 (1981) (describing
Bork as a "moderate originalist"). Cf. In Bork's Words: Abortion, Death Penalty, Gay Rights,
N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, § 1, at 8, col. 1 (Judge Bork stated in a speech at the University of
San Diego Law School, Nov. 25, 1985: "Original intent is the only legitimate basis for constitu-
tional decision . . ").
195. See Rosenthal, Bork Fight Gives Abortion Rights Convention Something to Shout
About, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1987, § 1, at 8, col. 1; Taylor, A Committed Conservative, N.Y.
Times, July 2, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 4, at 8, col. 5.
196. See Taylor, Bork's Evolving Views: Far From the New Deal, N.Y.- Times, July 8,
1987, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
197. See Rosenthal, supra note 195, at 8, col. 1; Dionne, Abortion, Bork and the '88 Cam-
paign, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1987, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
198. See Greenhouse, Ideology as Court Issue, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
See generally Friedman, Review Essay, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Su-
prenze Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283 (1986).
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ified potential nominees? By nature, the President's decision to nomi-
nate a particular individual to the Supreme Court is a political one.
By nature, the confirmation process also is a political one. Moreover,
the President's choice as the top candidate probably sets the political
tenor for the confirmation process. This is certainly true in the case
of Judge Bork's nomination.
Once on the Bench, the newly appointed Justice will soon establish
a voting record guaranteed to please some and displease others. Criti-
cism of the Justice's votes should focus upon the justifications for
those votes. For example, imagine that the newly appointed Justice
votes to overrule Roe based upon a belief that the Court interpreted
the Constitution erroneously in deciding that case. The Justice's opin-
ion of Roe on that basis can be neither right nor wrong, because no
one can authoritatively determine how the Constitution can and should
be interpreted.
In contrast, as the newly appointed Justice's voting record becomes
established, the Justice can be criticized for being internally inconsis-
tent, as Justice Powell appeared to be on various right of privacy
issues discussed in the text above. Equally important, and of greater
immediate concern in trying to fill the current vacancy, the newly
appointed Justice can be judged harshly for a cavalier disregard for
precedent. If the Court is to retain its role as the supreme, neutral,
and objective institution in our democratic national government, then
the newly appointed Justice cannot vote to overrule a prior case with-
out a written justification. Moreover, any such justification should be
divorced from the Justice's personal ideological beliefs about constitu-
tional interpretation. Any Justice who fails to attempt a principled
explanation for a retreat from stare decisis, or who totally disregards
precedent because of a disagreement with the prior majority's views
of constitutional interpretation, would legitimately be open to sharp
criticism for "politicizing" the vote. Most important, whenever a Jus-
tice votes to overrule a case and fails to provide a written explanation
that is divorced from personal ideological beliefs, that Justice casts
doubts upon the Court's institutional credibility.
In summary, it is somewhat ironic that the political battle opposing
Judge Bork is aimed at preventing him from sitting on the Court and
having the potential to "politicize" votes in Supreme Court opinions.
Nevertheless, the framers assured (in reality, even if not in theory)
that the nomination and confirmation process would be political by
providing in the Constitution for the President to appoint Supreme
Court Justices with the advice and consent of the Senate.,,, Once the
199. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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executive and legislative branches agree on a candidate, however, the
Constitution also assures that the Justice is protected from the political
process by being given life tenure and a salary that cannot be di-
minished.- It is imperative, then, that the Supreme Court Justices
provide reasons for each opinion - reasons that are as devoid of
political influence and personal ideological beliefs as is humanly possi-
ble.
200. Id. at art. III, § 1.
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